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iABSTRACT
This report examines the issues associated with government programs pro-
posed for the "commercialization" of new energy technologies; these programs
are intended to hasten the pace at which target technologies are adopted by
the private sector. The "commercial demonstration" is the principal tool used
in these programs. Most previous government interventions in support of tech-
nological change have focussed on R&D and left to the private sector the de-
cision as to adoption for commercial utilization; thus there is relatively
little in the way of analysis or experience which bears direct application.
The analysis is divided into four sections. First, the role of R,D&D
within the structure of the national energy goals and policies is examined.
me issue o "prices verss gaps" i± ~ brd a& a uci diff Ierence of view-
point concerning the role of the government in the future of the energy system.
Second, th of technolic hae as it occurs with respect to energy
technologies is then examined for possible sources of misalgmenr or social
and private incentives. The process is described as 'a series of investments.
Third, correction of these sources of misalignment then becomes the goal of
commercialtcdemonstration programs -as tris goal and the means for attaining it
are explored. Government-supported commercialization may be viewed as a sub-
sidy to the introduction stage of the process; the circumstances under which
such subsidies are likely to affect the success of the subsequent diffusion
stage are addressed. The discussion then turns to the political, legal, and
institutional problems. Finally, methods for the evaluation and planning of
commercial demonstration programs are analzed. The critical areas of ig- ~'
norance are ighlighted and compri research agenda for improved analy-
tical techniques to support decisions in this area.
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1SUMMARY
The United States government has set out to "commercialize" a number of
new energy technologies. This is a relatively new role for federal agencies.
Except in areas (such as defense) where the sponsoring agency was simultaneously
the customer for the results, public expenditure on technology has generally
been confined to research and development. The pace of the process whereby
new technologies were put to commercial use, and the decisions about the in-
vestments that make up that process, were left to the private sector.
The energy problem is leading us to depart from this norm. Through the
Energy Research and Development Administration the government is investing sub-
stantially in energy technology, and there is natural pressure--from the Con-
gress, the agency itself, and a wider set of private and public interests--in
support of programs to accelerate private adoption of the new techniques and
devices. The list of the objects of such programs, either in effect or ser-
iously proposed, includes the breeder reactor, geothermal energy, new automotive
powerplants, electric vehicles, solar heating and cooling, solar electricity
generation, and synthetic fuels.
This new set of federal programs raises a number of issues of economic
policy, public-private relations, and program analysis and management. This
report attempts to identify and explore these issues. We hope to contribute
to a clearer view of the context in which such programs must operate, and to
identify ways to maximize their contribution to the nation's energy future.
The focus is on the "commercial demonstration", which is the mechanism most
2commonly used in these programs.
R,D&D as a Component of U.S. Energy Policy
There are two aspects to the energy problem facing the United States.
First, there is a national security and foreign policy problem caused by our
dependence on a small number of foreign countries for an increasing share of
our energy supply. This is a short-term difficulty and, if not corrected, a
long-term one as well. Second, the United States (and, in a few more decades,
the world) faces the depletion of low-cost resources of petroleum and natural
gas. Environmentally acceptable substitutes are much more expensive than oil
and gas, and the transition from our current energy system to whatever will
replace it is potentially a very painful one. This is a longer-term problem--
say on a horizon of 20 to 40 years. Because of the time lags associated with
the development, introduction, and diffusion of new technologies, R,D&D pro-
grams will not have a significant effect on the national security problem, at
least for the next decade or two. Other programs (such as a national petro-
leum stockpile) can help in that regard. R,D&D programs will reduce imports
in the long run, and will reduce the costs associated with the transition to
energy resources other than oil and gas.
Unfortunately, these two aspects of the energy problem, and the relevant
time horizons, tend to get blurred, and much discussion of the issue is founded
on disagreements about the formulation of the problem, on disparities in the
way we think about its solution, and on differences in conception of the way
the U.S. economy operates now and will operate in the future. There is, in
particular, one split in perceptions which is of crucial importance in evalua-
ting new technologies and is often not explicitly acknowledged. On the one
hand, much thought and analysis is focused on energy "needs", or "gaps" in
3energy supply, to be made good by the provision of particular fuels, or by
conservation. The concentration is on physical flows. Technologies are rated
according to how much can be brought on stream, and how soon, to cover the
shortfalls or "gaps". An alternative approach focuses on energy prices as
they operate in our market economy. In this view, there is no such thing as
an energy "gap": supply is always equal to demand absent price controls and
rationing. Some kinds of supply may be less desirable because they are in-
secure or because they damage the environment. But in all cases the central
question is the same: what price are we willing to pay to hold imports down
or avoid environmental losses? From this viewpoint the most important fact
about a technology is not the extent to which it may "close the gap" but its
cost, for it is its cost in relation to price that will determine its contri-
bution, and it is its cost which represents the total real resources it absorbs.
Therefore, a key question is whether the approach via "needs" and "gaps"
is appropriate over the next few decades. In the past, energy provision has
been left to private markets--some regulated and some not. Energy prices have
been the principal determinants of the magnitude and composition of the energy
sector, and of energy imports. The driving force has been profits, with
government policy measures having a significant influence over what was pro-
fitable. Whether this pattern should continue is a matter of some dispute, and
only future political events will prove which viewpoint was the more correct
for the 1970's.
The hypothesis adopted in this study is that, for the foreseeable future,
we are not likely to institute fundamental changes in the structure of the
energy sector. Neither are we likely to move in a determined, decisive way to
a more centrally-planned energy economy. For better or worse, the market
system will predominate in the United States.
4In this context, then, what is the role for ERDA's R,D&D programs in
meeting the national energy goals? These goals tend to be stated in terms of
reducing oil imports. There are two ways to reduce the demand for petroleum:
We can lower the demand for energy services (in particular those provided by
petroleum-using technologies), or we can substitute other factors of production
(capital, labor, and non-energy materials) for petroleum in producing a given
level of energy services. R,D&D programs do not directly influence the former.
There are several ways to accomplish substitution away from petroleum--for
example, by (1) regulation of supply and utilization technology, (2) price
controls and financial subsidies, and (3) lowering the cost of substitution
of the other factors for petroleum. But again the first two are not in ERDA's
hands.
Therefore, the key way ERDA can serve national energy goals may be very
simply and starkly stated: it can undertake programs that lower the cost of
substitutes for oil, both now and in the future. That is, the basic purpose
of the ERDA programs can be seen as the lowering of the cost of substitution
of other energy sources or other inputs for oil in the near term, and lowering
of cost of transition away from oil to more abundant (or inexhaustible) energy
sources in the future. There are two ways in which ERDA can accomplish these
ends. The first, and most important, is to support energy R,D&D. By performing
such work itself, or supporting it elsewhere, ERDA can change the nature of the
technological opportunities, lowering the costs of substitutes for oil. This
role is no doubt very important. However, in this paper the focus is on the
second way in which ERDA can reduce the cost of substitutes to the consumer.
This is to subsidize the introduction of new technologies into the marketplace.
As noted earlier, ERDA's chosen instrument for accomplishing this is the com-
mercial demonstration.
5Commercialization and the Process of Technological Change
If the United States is unlikely to depart from its long tradition of
private markets in the energy sector, then a new energy technology will achieve
wide use only if it can meet the test of commercial viability. We can state a
simple working definition of necessary conditions for commercialization of a
new technology:
Given: (1) the market prices of labor and material inputs, (2) the
relevant cost of capital, (3) the market price of energy, and (4) taxes,
legal restrictions on the relevant production possibilities, or other
government intervention--then commercialization of a new technology will
take place if it is available at a cost that allows the private sector
an acceptable rate of return on the capital required.
Only if brought to the point where it meets this condition will a new idea be
viable. However, a new technology usually goes through a long process of events
in achieving this status. Four rough phases can be identified: invention,
development, introduction, and diffusion. Because these activities cost money,
and offer no immediate return, the expenditures involved are investments, and
each of the steps is usefully thought of as involving an investment choice.
That is, at each step the firm acquires a new asset; the asset is expected to
yield a favorable return itself, or to open the way to some subsequent invest-
ment that will yield a profit. It is the introduction stage and its link to
diffusion that is the target of federal programs and proposals in the area of
"commercialization."
Several other aspects of this part of the process merit special attention.
One is market differentiation. The simple definition given above might be taken
to imply that a technology is either "commercial", or it is not. But this would
be a misleading simplification of reality. Commercial adoption is not a simple
transition from non-use to use; it is a part of the dynamic and complex process
whereby a new concept may penetrate some markets but not others, or where the
6penetration may move at very different rates depending on prices, weather,
market structure, etc. Second, energy technologies themselves may present
very different challenges at the introduction stage, and the role played by
the first plants may be very different. A third consideration is the set of
complex adjustments that may be involved in integrating a new technology into
a highly developed and interrelated production and marketing system, where the
key firms have a structure and personality compatible with the previous pro-
duct mix.
Thus the term "commercial" really applies to an equilibrium end-state for
the process of technological change, and any attempt to influence the pace of
the process must deal with a complex transition from prototype to widespread
utilization.
To address the role of ERDA in this context, the process needs to be
analyzed for reasons why, or areas where, private markets do not automatically
produce the desired results. The point of departure for such analysis is the
fact that, for the most part, the system generally does work well. The posi-
tion of the United States as world leader in many if not most fields of in-
dustrial technology is a salient indication of this fact. Therefore, an exam-
ination of market performance is a first step in the search for projects ERDA
might usefully undertake. We focus in particular on failures in the market
process at the introduction stage--failures that might be corrected by com-
mercialization programs.
Such a problem, or "market failure", occurs when energy prices do not
reflect the value of energy to society. Domestic petroleum prices are deter-
mined by a complex interaction of the usual supply and demand forces, and
controls imposed by our own and foreign governments. Because the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) determines the price of imports, and
7because imports are the marginal source of supply to the United States, the
value of a barrel of oil in the United States is at least the landed price of
international crude. However, government price controls hold domestic prices
well below this level. Thus a private firm will not obtain a suitable return
for introducing a conservation technology which would be economic to the pur-
chaser at the international price but not the domestic price. Natural gas
price controls have a similar effect. Given these price controls, there are
undoubtedly many cases where government subsidies for the introduction of new
conservation technologies would provide substantial social returns.
Moreover, the social value of domestic oil is not determined solely by
the international price--there is also the issue of import "dependence".
This is a social cost which would not be reflected in private prices even if
those prices were not controlled by the government. Since a barrel of oil
domestically produced or conserved effectively translates into avoidance of an
imported barrel, it is the international price plus the "national security
premium" which is the effective social value of domestic supplies. Again, the
undervaluation of domestic energy results in a failure in private investment
decisions.
In addition to the undervaluation of domestic energy, the special costs
associated with the introduction of new technologies into the marketplace can
result in a market failure which is concentrated at the introduction stage.
Thus, it may be that the proprietary technical and cost information developed
at the introduction stage is sufficiently attractive to induce socially desir-
able outlays, but regulatory and other institutional problems intervene. Im-
portant institutional, regulatory, and political issues posed by the new tech-
nology may be resolved only by substantial production and use. This is cer-
tainly true with respect to some synthetic fuels. Important information about
8effluent levels of full-scale plants may be inferred from observing pilot
plants, for example, but the issue of what effluent levels are acceptable is
difficult to resolve until production is attempted on a commercial scale.
This is a special kind of distortion of private decision making--investment
may be artificially discouraged because society has not gotten around to
specifying what rules the new technology will operate under. The pioneering
firm must face these regulatory risks, but subsequent firms may not. The nation
as a whole benefits from the resolution of the regulatory uncertainties, but the
costs are borne by one firm. Thus, a socially desirable introduction may be
foregone or delayed.
This circumstance suggests where a well-designed government intervention
may be useful. If valuable new technologies are blocked by the regulatory
risks, then an off-setting subsidy may be in order. The subsidy would not only
encourage use of the technology, which is presumably good in itself, but also
lead to a resolution of the regulatory risk and open the way to further, un-
subsidized investment. Careful study of the nature of the regulatory problem
should, once again, offer guidance as to what kind of subsidy will most ef-
fectively resolve the issue.
Other possible sources of market failure are the non-appropriability of
technical results, problems of market structure, and excessive risk aversion
in private firms. Any of these may be relevant in a given circumstance, though
it does not appear that they often will be important. Patents, and the ad-
vantages of being first to introduce a new technology, generally allow pioneering
firms to capture the major share of the benefits from technical improvements in
introduction. The impact of market structure on technological innovation is
not well understood, and it is unclear that there is any a priori reason to
assume that the introduction of new technologies is inhibited in this regard.
9Finally, the nation's capital markets are generally considered to be reasonably
efficient at spreading of risk, so in general it is reasonable to assume that
investments in profitable new technologies will be forthcoming.
It is problems in energy pricing and the non-appropriability of the resolu-
tion of regulatory risks that are--most likely to be the sources of socially
erroneous investment decisions on the introduction of new energy technologies.
Goals and Means of Government-Supported Commercial Demonstrations
The principal purpose of ERDA's commercial demonstration programs, then,
seems reasonably clear: ERDA should subsidize the introduction of socially
profitable new energy technologies to the extent that they are being impeded by
low energy prices or by high regulatory uncertainties whose resolution would be
of value to more than one firm.
However, ERDA must perform this function within an environment which is
not under its control. Specifically, energy prices are determined by a com-
bination of foreign governments, higher level policy decisions of the U.S.
government, and market forces. As we have discussed, technological change is'
the result of a series of investments, investments which are made in the ex-
pectation of a suitable return. Expected prices are the key parameters, ex-
ternal to the firm, which affect the investment decisions. In the early stages
of the process, the relevant expected prices are those several decades in the
future. At the introduction stage, however, the relevant prices, in relation
to expected costs, are crucial to the investment decision, and they are not
changed by a commercial demonstration program.
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Thus, in most cases the long-run commercial potential of a new technology
will be relatively independent of possible interventions by ERDA in the intro-
duction stage. This is because, in most cases, the costs of the introduction
stage which are not recovered during that stage, are a small fraction of the
total cost of the product after introduction. Therefore, most technologies
which appear to be commercial in the long-run, will be introduced and "commer-
cialized" by the private sector. In most cases, ERDA commercial demonstration
programs therefore simply do not have very much leverage. They may be useful,
but they are not often likely to be decisive in determining the fate of a new
technology.
Even where it appears that a government-supported commercial demonstration
can perform the sort of useful social function described here, one must be sure
that these expenditures are the most efficient method. In fact, government-
supported demonstrations attempt to reduce technical and institutional uncer-
tainties with what might be termed a "brute force" technique. In many cases
the resolution of the relevant technical and institutional uncertainties may
not require the actual construction of commercial-scale plants. For example,
an obvious alternative for resolving legal and regulatory uncertainties is
direct intervention in the public decision-making process in support of expe-
dited action. This could take the form of requests or orders to regulatory or
legislative bodies, or studies which would provide the key data necessary for
resolution of regulatory problems. While it is not clear that such activities
will necessarily be less expensive than the net cost of a commercial demonstra-
tion, such alternatives should always be considered.
Whatever the details of the specification, the goals of a demonstration
program imply criteria for the choice of public instruments. We have argued
that the purposes of government-supported commercial demonstration projects are
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principally to support the development of the information associated with the
resolution of the technical and institutional uncertainties concerning new
energy technologies, and to provide a subsidy to foster the introduction and
widespread use of technologies faced with inappropriate energy prices. With
these goals in mind, some general considerations of program design can be laid
out.
Both goals lead immediately to a concern that the commercial demonstrations
be conducted in such a way as to simulate the normal workings of the private
sector--i.e., the influence of the subsidy should be as small as possible be-
yond the obvious fact that it is lowering the cost of the actual demonstration
to the firms involved. This implies that the participants in the program
should be those who would be dealing with the technology under circumstances of
widespread use, and that the incentive structure associated with their partici-
pation should be as "realistic" as possible.
The incentives to private participants will be strongly dependent on the
actual mechanism used to deliver the subsidy. Ideally, the mechanism should
provide project managers with a circumstance which looks the same as that which
they would face in the unsubsidized case. This is important with respect to
the choice of inputs--especially capital as compared with labor, transportation,
maintenance, etc. The incentives with respect to risk-taking also should be as
realistic as possible.
Finally, financing mechanisms should reveal the full costs of the pro-
gram and the detailed cost performance of individual technologies. There will
of course be large uncertainties in estimates of both the costs and benefits
of such programs, but some financing methods allow greater visibility than
others. Clearly, if the extent of the subsidy is not well known, then the
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true cost will not be readily calculated from the product prices. If this
is the case, then uncertainty of major significance will remain.
Many forms for government subsidies have been proposed for commercial
demonstration programs. These include tax expenditures, direct government
operation, price guarantees, loan guarantees, and the rolling-in of demonstra-
tion costs with other costs in the special case of regulated industries. We
did not analyze each of these possibilities in the detail they deserve. The
key criteria of visibility of subsidy costs and minimal distortion of factor
input prices point immediately toward specific project-by-project price sup-
ports, which fare well against both criteria. The two criteria similarly
point away from the use of loan guarantees--their value is difficult to cal-
culate, they subsidize capital as opposed to other inputs, and they distort
incentives for follow-on investments.
Evaluation and Planning
The concepts used here provide a framework for analyzing commercial
demonstration programs. However, the leap from qualitative concepts to de-
tailed quantitative calculations is long and uncertain, and we have much to learn
about the market processes we must analyze. As a first step in laying out
the evaluation program, an evaluation scheme must focus on the probability
distribution of the cost of energy saved or produced by the technical option
under consideration, should it attain wide-scale usage. This function sum-
marizes at any given time the set of expectations for improvements which would
result from investments in R,D&D as well as the technical and institutional
uncertainties which might affect the option. The relationship between this
function and similar sets of expectations concerning the market price and
social value of energy are at the core of the analysis of the likelihood of
13
private investments in R,D&D on the option and the desirability of public
investments.
Our development of the evaluation problem points to the identification of
several areas of analysis and forecasting which are crucial to the evaluation
of schemes of federal intervention in commercial demonstration. All analytical
efforts which attempt to evaluate national income benefits from this type of
investment must deal with these issues in one way or another. In each case the
available techniques allow analysis to take place but similarly in each case sub-
stantial improvements are needed to raise the level of confidence we can place
in such analysis. Thus, these key areas comprise an agenda for future research
to improve our ability to analyze government investments in energy R,D&D and
commercial demonstration in particular.
First, there is a need for price forecasts--both market prices and social
values. Such forecasts ultimately depend on analysis of international oil
markets, on the tariff or other policies that may be used to buffer the U.S.
economy from these prices, on the process of price formation in product and
regional markets throughout the economy, and the value to be placed on energy
independence.
Second, the evaluation of the benefits of the accelerated introduction of
new technologies depends ultimately on forecasts of the rate of diffusion of
those technologies through the relevant markets. In general, this requires a
set of analyses of transportation, processing, and energy technology choice
which can simulate the way the economy adjusts to a new technology, given that
the technology has been demonstrated in the introduction stage to offer cost
savings. For example, modeling efforts at Stanford Research Institute
(originally for Gulf Oil Corporation), and Brookhaven National Laboratory pro-
vide a framework for conditional forecasting of the expected penetration of
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new and emerging energy technologies and products based upon engineering in-
formation concerning the cost and efficiency attributes of these technologies.
However, two significant problems are not addressed by either of these
models, or by most other, less formal, studies of these circumstances. First,
we would expect that the actual commercial availability of a new technology
will depend critically not only on the level of prior R&D activity, but also
on market factors. Thus, an analysis which purports to explain the penetration
of new technologies must also explain the evolution of circumstances which lead
to the availability of those technologies at a point in time. This is an ex-
tremely difficult research issue. A second, and closely related issue, concerns
the demand for these new technologies. Simple studies of consumer behavior
based upon simple cost considerations are probably not adequate to characterize
consumer response to a new product or technology. The problem is essentially
one of using information on consumer response to existing technologies to pro-
ject their reactions to technologies and products which they have not yet ob-
served. Both the issues of technology availability and consumer demand for new
technologies are not addressed in the SRI-Gulf and Brookhaven models, nor by
any other formal studies of energy technology choice with which we are familiar.
Third, a key component of any analysis will be the estimation of the
likely investments in R,D&D that would take place without government inter-
vention. For example, it may be that government subsidy only substitutes for
industry investment that would take place in any case, or that it only speeds
up the introduction process by a period of a few months or a year or two.
This once again leads back to a need for a clearer understanding of the na-
ture of the market process of technology development, how it serves the social
good, and how one might gather information about likely industry involvement
15
at the introduction stage for different types of technologies.
The fourth key link is the estimation of the impact of the government-
supported commercial demonstration. That is, it is necessary to understand
and describe how the distribution function for ultimate costs will be affect-
ed by an introduction into the marketplace.
Finally, it is necessary to understand the costs and effects of the dif-
ferent instruments for supporting commercial demonstration. The alternative
instruments that may be used by the government to subsidize the introduction
stage may have very different costs. Different instruments may have distinct
effects on the amount of learning that takes place in the introduction stage.
In order to choose among types of programs, one needs to be able to distinguish
between the available instruments and their ability to produce a good measure
of the technical option's costs. But to know the option's cost in a situation
where government subsidies are present, the total cost of the subsidy must be
known; this is a difficult problem in and of itself.
These issues of evaluation provide a challenging set of topics which
should rank highly on the national agenda for policy research. It seems clear
that government programs aimed at accelerating the pace at which new techno-
logies become available and are utilized will absorb an increasi are of
public resources over the coming years. Our mixed capitalist economy responds
to such interventions in complex ways that analysis can serve to illuminate,
so that the public good can be served in the most effective and efficient
manner.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The federal government has set out to develop new technical options for
the country's energy sector. However, unlike most previous public R&D
efforts--especially those in defense, space, and war-time production--the
government is not simultaneously the customer for the results. There is no
doubt that the long-run measure of the success of the U.S. Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA) will be the degree to which its new
technologies see actual application. But under current policy and well-
established tradition, the ultimate technology choices will be left to pri-
vate corporations and the normal operation of our mixed capitalist system of
economic organization. This circumstance, coupled with a strong concern over
mounting dependence on oil imports, naturally leads to an attempt by federal
authorities to increase the rate at which new technologies are adopted. This
is being done through greater federal involvement in "commercial demonstra-
tions" and other "commercialization" schemes to help the introduction of new
energy technologies.
It is our purpose (1) to explore the issues that arise in connection
with government attempts to use commercial-scale demonstrations to spur tech-
nological change, (2) to review what is known about the economic and indus-
trial processes that are involved, and (3) to probe critical areas of ignor-
ance in an attempt to formulate an agenda for research in this area. We have
placed a high value on recording well the "facts-of-life" as we understand
them.
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1.1 PAST AND PRESENT GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE
The federal government has long been involved in supporting technological
change in the United States. In the past most of this support has fit into
three categories. One category is the development of systems which are part
of the government's own procurement needs. The bulk of this effort has been
in the areas of military and space technology. Much of modern civil aircraft
technology has come out of this activity, even though it was not an explicit
goal of the government's R&D programs.
The second category is the support of basic and applied research, with
the goal of advancing technology across a broad front, in support of particu-
lar economic sectors, national defense, or the growth of the economy as a
whole. Federal investment in agricultural technology has a long history; other
efforts grew out of the World War II experience, and have been carried out
principally by the National Science Foundation and the research offices of the
military services. The distinguishing feature of this support has been the
fact that the private sector was free to develop and employ the new technology
according to its own decision-making mechanisms. Generally, government support
for technology for civilian use was stopped when it was ready for incorpora-
tion into prototype products.
A third category has been important at times. This is government support
for the development and use of new technologies during war-time. A notable
example is the federal financing of the final technical development, and the
extensive production, of synthetic rubber during World War II. As discussed
in Appendix E, much of the basic science and technology of rubber synthesis
was available at the beginning of the War. It had not been put to commercial
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use because the cost was substantially greater than the price of natural
rubber. When natural rubber supplies were cut off, the government commenced
a massive program to construct synthetic rubber plants, utilizing a number
of different technologies. In this case the government was not the principal
purchaser of the product. However, it is distinguished from the current
circumstance by the extensive war-time government controls over important
sectors of the economy--setting prices, allocating raw materials and inter-
mediate goods, etc. So the infant synthetic rubber industry could hardly be
considered "commercial" under the definition used in this study.
The more recent programs and proposals under study here are different
from these earlier experiences of federal involvement in R&D. In the energy
sector, government action is being undertaken explicitly for the purpose of
supporting the commercial application of new technologies. The technologies
at issue may or may not have been developed under government support, but at
any event the government is not the buyer of the product. The technologies
are to be utilized by the private sector.l Commercialization programs were
embodied in legislation supporting the introduction of solar heating and
cooling and geothermal energy, which became law in 1974. The most prominent
1As discussed in a recent Rand Study, ["Analysis of Federally Funded Demon-
stration Projects" (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, April,
1976), Reports R-1925-DOC, R-1926-DOC, R-1927-DOC], there have been some
programs of this sort in the past. The most prominent are the civilian
application of nuclear power for electricity generation, discussed by Rand,
and the development of the civil supersonic transport, discussed in Appendix
D to this report.
2pL 93-409, "The Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974"; PL
93-410, "The Geothermal Energy Research and Development Act of 1974"; and
PL 93-430, "The Solar Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act
of 1974."
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and, if it had become law, by far the largest, would have been "Synthetic
Fuels Commercialization Program." The program was proposed by the
Administration.1 As reported out by the House Committee on Science and Tech-
nology,2 the program would have entailed U.S. government loan guarantees and/
or price supports for synthetic fuel plants producing the equivalent of
200,000 barrels of oil per day; $4 billion in loan guarantees would have been
authorized.
This is the type of program we examine in this paper. However, our
attention has not been limited to the solar, geothermal, or synthetic fuels
proposals. Because it appears that there will be an increasing number of
government-supported commercialization programs, we have attempted to focus
on the general issues associated with the government-supported commerciali-
zation of energy-related technologies.
1.2 THE FOCUS OF THIS STUDY: ERDA'S COMMERCIAL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS
In a study of federal "commercialization" activities there is a temp-
tation to focus discussion on overall national energy goals and on the full
range of policies that affect the energy sector. In particular, one of the
most important influences on the viability of new energy technologies is the
effective market price of energy--which is determined by policies regarding
import quotas or tariffs, price controls, widespread subsidies or taxes, etc.
Here however, we do not focus on efforts to change the long-run market situa-
tion for a new technical option, but rather on those activities aimed at
1
"Recommendations for a Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program," Synfuels
Interagency Task Force, 1975, Four Volumes.
2
"Loan Guarantees for Demonstration of New Energy Technologies," U.S. House
of Representatives Report No. 94-1170, May 16, 1976.
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getting an option into widespread commercial utilization within a given
market environment. This is a realistic limitation because by and large
the national policies that determine price and market conditions are made
independently of their impact on any particular class of new technical
options. This restriction holds with particular force as we analyze decisions
by ERDA, which has statutory responsibility for the research, development, and
demonstration (R,D&D) of new technical options, but not for the long-run con-
ditions which comprise their marketing environment.l
ERDA's principal tool in its commercialization programs is the govern-
ment-supported "commercial demonstration". That is, ERDA may subsidize (or
perform itself) the first "commercial-scale" utilization of a new technical
option. "Commercial-scale" may be roughly defined as the minimum scale which
would be used if the option were being introduced into the marketplace by the
private sector without government support. A distinguishing feature of the
commercial demonstration (and the source of much confusion) is that the net
revenues from sales of the product of the demonstration are likely to return
a substantial fraction of the total investment required. This is in con-
trast to the more common government-supported demonstration, which is gener-
ally at smaller scale and uses technology less well developed.
In the case of technology-specific subsidies, taxes, or regulations, the
decision to utilize them would obviously not be made independently of the
state of the technology, but even in this case ERDA does not have the rele-
vant responsibility (cf. FEA/ERDA Memorandum of Understanding, April, 1976).
The case is similar for other technology-specific governmental controls,
such as environmental regulations.
2The confusion arises because production is not the principal purpose of the
demonstration. Rather, the goal is to clarify the crucial uncertainties
associated with the new technical option. This is addressed below at some
length.
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1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Because the current and proposed commercialization activities are un-
precedented in their complexity and scale, and because the overall energy
policy of the country is in a continuing state of flux, it is necessary to
begin this discussion with a statement and interpretation of the broad energy
goals that have been set by the Administration and Congress. This is under-
taken in Section 2, and an attempt is made to take these broad statements and
re-phrase them into an operational definition of targets for federal activities
in the area of commercial demonstration. A fundamental problem facing the
agency is the estimation of the market conditions under which the substitution
of new technologies is expected to take place, and this is addressed.
Section 3 considers the role of the federal government in changing the
technology of energy supply and utilization. To set the context for subse-
quent discussion, a brief description of the process of technological change
is presented, and an attempt is made to define where the point of "commercial-
ization" is supported to occur. Given a brief description of the process,
attention is turned to various flaws or "failures" in that process and to the
role of federal intervention.
Section 4 then examines the goals for commercial demonstration programs
in particular, and the means for attaining them. The economics of the com-
mercial introduction process is first discussed with a focus on the circum-
stances where government-supported commercial demonstration projects are
likely to be effective. The goals of commercial demonstration projects also
may be met by other means at ERDA's disposal; these circumstances are examined
as well. There follows a discussion of the political, legal, and instititional
problems of commercial demonstration projects; even given a sound economic
basis, the implementation of such projects faces substantial difficulties.
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Finally, the specific policy measures for supporting commercial demonstrations
are addressed. A detailed review and analysis would be beyond the scope of
this study. Therefore, we have addressed the general criteria which should
be considered, and examined only one of these tools (i.e., loan guarantees) in
any detail.
Finally, in Section 5 we apply the general principles developed earlier
to an analysis of the problem of project and program evaluation. The dis-
cussion becomes somewhat more formal at this point, as the nature of the in-
vestment in a commercial demonstration project is examined. Section 5.3
focuses on our key areas of ignorance, and comprises an agenda for research
in this vital policy area.
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2. R,D&D AS A COMPONENT OF NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY
2.1 THINKING ABOUT THE ENERGY PROBLEM: GAPS OR PRICES?
Three years after the oil embargo there remains wide disagreement about
the nature of the energy problem. Some see a fundamental shortage of re-
sources; others argue that it is primarily a matter of national security.
The origin of the problem is variously attributed to the manipulations of oil
companies, to too much government interference in private markets, or to in-
sufficient federal action and too little support for new energy technologies.
For some observers the answer is found in new energy sources and in techno-
logical change; for others the only solution is a fundamental revision in the
values and life-style of American society. Naturally, these diverging views
lead to calls for a variety of conflicting federal actions. The lack of con-
sensus has been debilitating to the efforts of the Administration and the
Congress, and of private parties, to achieve a coordinated and vital energy
policy.
One split in viewpoint is especially important to discussions of federal
energy programs. So much misunderstanding and real difference of opinion stem
from divergence on this issue that it is important to begin with a clear state-
ment of the approach taken by the authors of this study. The issue concerns
the character of the energy "crisis" and the proper way to formulate solutions
to it. On the one hand, much thought and analysis is focused on energy
"needs", or "gaps" in energy supply, to be made good by the provision of
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particular fuels, or by conservation. The concentration is on physical flows.
Technologies are rated according to how much can be brought on stream, and
how soon, to cover the shortfalls or "gaps"
An alternative approach is to focus on energy prices as they operate in
a market economy. In this view, there is no such thing as an energy "gap":
supply is always equal to demand absent price controls and rationing. Some
kinds of supply may be less desirable because they are insecure or because
they damage the environment. But in all cases the central question is the
same: what price are we willing to pay to hold imports down or avoid environ-
mental losses? From this viewpoint the most important fact about a techno-
logy is not the extent to which it may "close the gap" but its cost, for it
is cost in relation to price that will determine whether it makes any contri-
bution at all.
The difference in viewpoint is fundamental. Usually it is not a diver-
gence of ideology. Rather, it is a difference in perception of how the U.S.
economy actually operates, of the driving force behind changes in the energy
sector, and about what policy tools are going to be applied. If the circum-
stance is formulated in terms of "needs" and the failure of assured supply,
then the task of government is to find new supply and utilization technologies,
design and build them, and ensure that they are used. This is the way energy
is managed in the centrally-controlled economies (where the "needs" approach
is called the method of "energy balances"). If the policy tools are available
and the society wills to use them, then the view is perfectly appropriate.
By consensus many services are provided that way in this country--e.g., postal
service, highways. Such an approach was successfully and appropriately used
for the planning and subsequent provision of key commodities during World War
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II. As discussed in Appendix E, the "gap" left by Japanese control of natural
rubber supplies was successfully closed by government-supported production,
supplemented by detailed regulation of the importation, pricing and utiliza-
tion of available synthetic and natural rubber supplies.
The issue is whether the approach via "needs" and "gaps" is appropriate
with regard to the United States over the next few decades. In the past,
energy provision has been left to the workings of private markets--some regu-
lated and some not. Energy prices and the relation of those prices to the
costs of domestic supply and conservation measures have been the principal
determinants of the magnitude and composition of the energy sector, and of
energy imports. The driving force has been profits, with the government as
one of the determinants of what was profitable.l Whether this should continue
is a matter of some dispute. Perhaps the national security problem presented
by oil dependence requires a drastic change. Perhaps the prices implied by a
commitment to energy independence are socially intolerable because of the po-
tential impact on life-style and on the income distribution. If so, techno-
logical change may relieve this squeeze by producing energy at costs lower
than otherwise available. If the new technologies did not prove competitive
then they would need to be subsidized, and more government direction of energy
markets would serve this end.
The hypothesis adopted here is that for the foreseeable future we are not
likely to institute fundamental changes in the structure of the energy sector,
or move in a determined, decisive way to a more centrally-controlled energy
1For example, while leaving most investment and operating choices to the pri-
vate sector, public policy has had a great effect on the oil sector through
various financial incentives, such as the foreign tax credit and the deple-
tion allowance.
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economy. For better or worse, the market system will predominate in the U.S.
In fact the very word "commercialization" presumes that the market system
will predominate in the energy sector.
If private markets will pervade the energy sector, then "gap" analysis
(which tends to ignore prices and profits) involves analytical and planning
tools, and more importantly, policy prescriptions, that are inconsistent with
the facts of our economic organization. "Commercial demonstration" of new
technologies, either supply-augmenting or demand-diminishing, can lead to
economically viable new industries only if the expected price regime which
these technologies will face provides the incentives for investments to bring
them forth. When the role of prices is ignored, the policy goals seem to be
those of reducing uncertainties regarding costs of the new technologies. The
implicit assumption is that when the new technologies are demonstrated as
technically feasible and the uncertainties regarding costs and productivities
are "eliminated", commercial penetration is assured. In fact, these activities
may have very little to do with commercial potential, unless one imagines a
massive increase in government direction of energy markets.
2.2 NATIONAL ENERGY GOALS
Against this viewpoint, we may contrast recent proclamations of national
energy goals. As stated by the current Administration, these goals are
heavily related to national security, and to the holding down of energy costs
to the American consumer. Three main policy goals were put forth in the 1975
State-of-the-Union message and reaffirmed in the 1976 Energy Message:
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--"First, to halt -our growing dependence on imported oil during the
next few critical years.
--"Second, to attain energy independence by 1985 by achieving invul-
nerability to disruptions caused by oil import embargoes. Specifi-
cally, we must reduce oil imports to between 2 and 3 million barrels
a day, with an accompanying ability to off-set any future embargo
with stored petroleum reserves and emergency standby measures.
--"Third, to mobilize our technology and resources to supply a signifi-
cant share of the free world's energy needs beyond 1985."
In additon, the Administration has enunciated a set of principles that are to
guide the development of the program:
--"Provide energy to the American consumer at the lowest possible cost
consistent with our overall economic goals.
--"Make energy decisions consistent with our overall economic goals.
--"Balance environmental goals with energy requirements.
--"Rely upon the private sector and market forces as the most efficient
means of achieving the Nation's goals, but act through the government
where the private sector is unable to achieve our goals.
--"Seek equity among all our citizens in sharing of benefits and costs
of our energy program.
--"Coordinate our energy policies with those of other consuming nations
to promote interdependence, as well as independence."l
The three main policy goals are stated in terms of physical quantities
and, following the argument laid out above, one's view of the task of a fed-
eral energy R,D&D agency is strongly conditioned by the seriousness that is
attached to these physical targets. If the import "gap" must be closed to
3-to-5 million barrels per day by 1985, then the task of an R,D&D agency is
clear: prepare the technologies to close the gap, at minimum cost, as with
1These goals and guidelines are discussed in "A National Plan for Energy Re-
search, Development and Demonstration: Creating Energy Choices for the
Future" (ERDA, April, 1976), ERDA Report No. 76-1.
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military procurement. Moreover, it is not unreasonable for R,D&D managers to
assume that the necessary federal regulations and directives to employ the new
technologies will be forthcoming "where the private sector is unable to achieve
our goals". Else the goal would not be stated so starkly.
On the other hand, if one assumes that the country is not likely to in-
stitute a major shift toward government direction of energy supply and utiliza-
tion, then more attention must focus on the traditional forces that have moved
the energy sector--prices, costs, and profits. One's political judgment may
be that, for the people and Congress, the goal of 1985 imports at half the
current level is not so important as to override other aspects of federal
policy and well-established tradition. Or, one may feel that such a goal (and
the use of federal programs to attain it) is simply wasteful; the price is too
high, particularly considering alternative methods for ameliorating the secur-
ity problem. Either way, rather than formulate the issue in terms of strict
quantitative targets one will tend to think in terms of prices, and of an ob-
jective of lowering the costs of new technologies.
Of course, in focusing so closely on the real flows of oil and their
costs, there are subtleties in the R,D&D policy that may be overlooked. In
particular, there may be significant international and political aspects in
the medium term, say through 1990, even though the direct effect of "commer-
cialization" efforts on oil imports will be quite small. Thus, there appar-
ently is some hope that merely signalling our intention ultimately to reduce
U.S. dependence on Arab exports will influence the psychological environment
of international diplomacy so as to reduce the leverage and bargaining power
of the Arab states. The room for American initiative will be increased, and
the likelihood of Arab nations taking (or threatening) actions inimical to
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American interest will decline.
There is another related point. The dependence on our Japanese and
European allies on Arab oil is much greater than that of the U.S. itself;
this is true now and will continue in the future. Under the assumption that
the economic strength and foreign policy orientation of these allies will be
no less important in the future than they are now, the resistance to coercion
of Europe and Japan is also an important foreign policy objective for the
U.S. Yet there is no prospect of these nations, as a group, reducing their
relative dependence on oil imports to even the present U.S. level, which is
widely considered to be unacceptably high. Thus, even with zero imports to
the United States, we would be far from true "energy independence."
Of course, what people believe may be as important as the facts of the
matter so far as understanding developments in federal policy are concerned.
The ability of the United States to retain its position of leadership in in-
ternational negotiations over energy and related issues of the world's dis-
tribution of income and power will depend in part on perceptions of America's
willingness to make major commitments to solve its own energy problems. In
these complex international processes, the commercialization activities may
play an important symbolic role.
Doubtless, much of the history of these programs, especially the syn-
thetic fuels commercialization program, has been influenced by this aspect.
Unfortunately, ambitious-sounding programs, widely publicized internationally,
can reduce U.S. credibility if they come to be seen as mere words. The
national policy of "Project Independence", as declared in the crisis months
of 1973-1974, is now widely discredited abroad (as well as at home). At that
time the government policy was that world oil prices were "too high" and that
32
a combination of domestic and foreign policy would bring them down. They have
risen by nearly 50 percent since then.
Based on these observations, we may accept the broad sense of the goals
stated above, but we may want to revise the language somewhat. First, we have
a national security problem which is created by the fact that we import a large
fraction of our petroleum from a small group of countries. One goal is to re-
duce this insecurity, perhaps by lowering the demand for imports in the short
run and by avoiding high import levels in the future. Presumably there is
some domestic cost beyond which we would not go in attempting to reduce im-
ports, for at some level there are other, less expensive ways to deal with the
security problem (e.g., more extensive storage schemes).
Second, there is a longer-run problem of the transition from oil and gas
to other energy sources. The government does well to be concerned with this
transition quite apart from the national security problem. Once again, the
goal can be stated in terms of powering the demand for energy in the longer
term, though presumably not at any price.
2.3 MEANS OF MOVING TOWARD NATIONAL GOALS
If we may accept this more general description of the goals of policy,
then we may proceed by noting that there are two ways to reduce the demand for
oil:
(i) Lower the demand for energy services, in particular those services
involving petroleum-using technologies. As delivered energy prices
change, the demand for energy services will be affected. For ex-
ample, higher gasoline prices will reduce the vehicle miles
traveled (all else held the same).
(ii) Substitute other factors of production for petroleum products in
producing a given level of energy services. Such factors include
both other primary energy sources, and other factors of production
(capital, labor, and other material inputs).
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Factor substitution may take place either through regulation, or changes
in relative factor prices. Examples of important substitutions which could
be induced either by regulation or price changes include using coal and/or
nuclear power to replace oil in base-load electric power generation, or the
use of coal in place of petroleum products as a boiler fuel in operating
petroleum refineries. Capital and labor may also be substituted for petroleum
in boiler use, for example, through more frequent inspection and maintenance
of boiler equipment, and by the installation of more elaborate monitoring
systems for detecting leaks.
The substitution process works both ways, of course. As oil prices fell
over the past few decades, there was a shift away from coal and wood to oil.
Later, with the extension of pipelines, the same process occurred for natural
gas. Also, with falling energy prices, consumers substituted energy for other
inputs and dropped the use of energy-saving methods. For example, as dis-
cussed in Appendix B, the use of recuperators for capturing the heat in stack
gases was common in the early part of the century, but this device disappeared
from many industries as the price of energy fell (relative to capital) over
the intervening decades. If relative energy prices rise, the reverse process
takes place.
Three types of government actions may influence the process:
(1) Regulation of supply and utilization technology: For example, this
might involve rules against installation of oil-fired burners, the
55 mph speed limit, or energy-conserving building codes for new
residential and commercial demonstration.
(2) Price controls and financial subsidies: Government policy in-
fluences substitution by affecting the relative prices of factors
of production.
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(3) Lowered costs: The government may take measures which lower the
supply costs of factors competing with oil, thereby encouraging
substitution.
But items 1 and 2 above are not in ERDA's hands. Moreover, it is not likely
that the federal government will undertake major revisions in the nature and
degree of federal direction of energy markets through large-scale efforts at
technology regulation or wide-scale subsidy programs.
Therefore, the key means by which ERDA can serve national energy goals
may be very simply and starkly stated: Lower the cost of substitutes for oil,
both now and in the future. That is, the basic purpose of the ERDA programs
can be seen as the lowering of the cost of substitution of other energy
sources or other inputs for oil in the near term, and lowering the cost of
transition away from oil to more abundant (or inexhaustible) energy sources
in the future.
The first and most important way to do this is to support energy R&D. By
performing such work itself, or supporting it elsewhere, ERDA can actually
change the nature of the technology trade-off. By making new technological
options available, ERDA can actually lower the true costs of substitutes for
oil.
In this paper, however, we focus on a second way in which ERDA can reduce
the cost of substitutes--i.e., to subsidize the introduction of new techno-
logies into the marketplace. Generally before commercial-scale usage of a new
product or process is undertaken, the major technical uncertainties associated
with it have been resolved. On the other hand, many of the details which will
ultimately determine its real cost may remain to be fixed. Thus there often
are substantial introduction costs, which must be borne by some pioneer firm,
or firms, before the new option can achieve widespread adoption. These intro-
duction costs are most often associated with the lowering of the technical,
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institutional, legal, and regulatory uncertainties associated with large-scale
production and widespread usage. ERDA's method for giving this subsidy has
been the commercial demonstration. Through subsidized commercial demonstration,
ERDA lowers the costs of substitution, and therefore indirectly reduces the
cost of the substitute.
Needless to say, this is a very roughly summarized view of what ERDA can
do. It is useful to have even such a crude conception, however, when dis-
cussing the issue of commercial demonstration, for it is this aspect of ERDA
policy that most dramatically raises the question of the process by which new
technologies are adopted in the economy and of the difficulty of any attempt
to affect the direction and pace of this technological change.
2.4 THE PROBLEM OF THE "PLANNING PRICE"
Through R,D&D the federal government is undertaking to develop new lower-
cost technologies for adoption in private markets. Where there are special
problems at the point of market introduction, ERDA will use the mechanism of
commercial demonstration to try to accelerate market penetration. Naturally,
for each technology, there is some set of market conditions that will have to
be met. There are several aspects of energy markets that are relevant, but
the most important is the energy price itself. For technologies that promise
to achieve a cost below expected market prices, there is a reasonable ex-
pectation that the substitution discussed above will take place. For those
with less promise for cost reduction there is no such expectation. Of course,
ERDA's mission is to find and support the technologies that offer promise of
being competitive, and to do this there must be some notion of what price is
appropriate for the analysis and selection process.
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As one looks forward to the adoption decisions by private firms, there
are other factors besides expected price that are important. For example,
the risk perceived by a firm contemplating investment in a new technology is
affected not only by the expected future prices but by expectations about the
rules or procedures by which those prices will be set. It is one thing if
prices are expected to follow, more or less, the developments in world energy
markets; it is quite another if there is a prospect of continued domestic
price controls (or selective subsidies), or of an active tariff/quota policy,
even if the expected price is roughly the same. A policy of more widespread
regulation of rates of return represents yet another state of future markets,
and the calculation of the viability of particular technologies might be dif-
ferent yet again.
Thus, in order to allocate its resources efficiently, ERDA is faced with
a continuing problem of determining an appropriate set of likely prices, and
other market conditions, which its technologies must confront in future years.
The incorporation of these considerations is particularly important in the
evaluation of commercial demonstration programs, where the hope is that the
technology will prove profitable (as perceived by private market calculations)
at the completion of the program. Today many domestic energy prices are being
held down by price controls, even below the cost of imports. There has been
discussion of a tariff floor, to protect investments against the risk of
failure of the oil cartel, but no policy has been set. Similarly, long-term
subsidies for specific fuels have been proposed, but the issue is not resolved.
Even the fundamental structure of energy supply industries--private versus
public ownership and development, or the regulation of rates of return--is
the subject of serious questioning, particularly in the area of new bulk
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supply technologies.
Thus, in anticipation of increases in energy price, ERDA may carry new
technologies to commercial-scale demonstration and even subsidize the first
one or two plants in order to avoid delay in working out critical technical
problems and institutional barriers. But then two disturbing questions emerge:
(1) Where does the process of demonstration end and that of longer-term
subsidy begin, and how far along this process should ERDA carry its
activities? At present, ERDA has no mandate to carry out long-term
subsidy programs.
(2) What targets, in terms of expected price and other market condi-
tions, should ERDA be striving for with each of its technologies?
Clearly the proper timing of expenditures on particular types of
technology, and the allocation among different technologies, de-
pends on the likely future trajectory of energy price and energy
sector organization. But these market conditions are being set
for a host of reasons other than their influence on substitution
in the energy sector.
It is not clear to what degree ERDA has a responsibility or a mandate to try
to override or correct for the results of domestic price control policy, or to
try to influence the other market conditions that influence the attractive-
ness of various technologies. It also is not clear what future conditions
ERDA should be anticipating in planning its programs, so that reasonable
success in lowering the costs of different technologies actually produces
results at critical times along the way. This is an issue that clearly calls
for further investigation and clarification, and for the development of im-
proved methods of analysis.
Here we call attention to the issue of future market conditions by focusing
on two energy prices which ERDA must establish in order to evaluate R,D&D pro-
jects. One is a "planning price" which, as discussed above, is the likely ef-
fective market price of the relevant energy form. More specifically, it is
the actual energy price in private markets, including the effects of the
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relevant government modifications to those markets. This would include what-
ever subsidies are applicable to a particular technical option. Of course,
this is a future price--so it must reflect ERDA's expectations for future con-
ditions of supply and demand, and forecasts of goverment intervention. Ob-
viously a single price will not match the gross complexities discussed above;
in reality some probability distribution will be required and the distribution
will be different for the various energy options.
A second "price" with which ERDA must deal is one that may or may not
actually appear in energy markets. It is the social value of energy--the
amount the society should be willing to pay for one more unit of a given
energy source. Of course, it would be the best of all worlds, at least with
respect to economic efficiency in the energy sector, if these two prices were
the same. However, for reasons we have already discussed, and will address
further below, this condition does not appear to hold now and is not likely
to do so in the future. Some measure of the social value of energy is necessary
for the evaluation of R,D&D programs, however, for it provides a basis for
determinating whether investment in a new technical option is socially profit-
able.
We return in Section 5 to address more general issues of project evalua-
tion. First, however, it is necessary to review the process by which substitu-
tion of new technology takes place, and to put the particular activities of
commercial demonstration into perspective within the wider context of the be-
havior of American industry.
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3. "COMMERCIALIZATION" AND THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
When we speak of a society's "technology" we refer to the ability to com-
bine capital, labor, and other inputs in the production of goods and services.
At any point in time this technology is embodied in the latest capital goods,
the skills of labor, and the collective knowledge of how to combine them. By
a change in technology it may become possible to produce more of a given good
or service from a fixed set of inputs (a change in process) or to produce some
totally new product. If input prices hold constant, then a process innovation
lowers the cost of the product.
A change in technology has no effect, however, unless it becomes a change
in "technique", by which we refer to that combination of input factors and
knowledge which is actually in use. When a previously unused but known tech-
nology is brought into use, there is a change in technique which is not a
change in technology. Recent changes in energy prices have yielded many ex-
amples of such changes in technique alone--leading to the substitution of
capital, labor, and other inputs for energy. There also are examples of
changes in technology that have been (or will be) incorporated as changes in
technique. It is this latter type of change that is our concern in this
study, with a special focus on changes that facilitate substitution away from
the use of petroleum.
It was argued above that the United States is not likely to depart from
its long tradition of limited government intervention in the energy sector,
and that therefore a new energy technology will achieve the status of a widely-
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used technique only if it can meet the test of commercial markets. As a
starting point, then, it is useful to state a simple definition of the
necessary conditions for commercialization:
Given: (1) the market prices of labor and material inputs, (2) the
relevant cost of capital, (3) the market price of energy, and (4)
taxes, legal restrictions on the relevant production possibilities,
or other government intervention--then commercialization of a new
technology will take place if it is available at a cost that allows
the private sector an acceptable rate of return on the capital required.
While this simple definition may apply in markets at equilibrium, it defines
only the end point of the process of technical change, and it is this process
which will draw our attention here. A new technology must be brought to the
point where it meets the above criterion, or it will not ultimately be viable.
This is the fundamental hypothesis of a study of the "commercialization" of
new technologies, given that a centrally-directed energy sector is not anti-
cipated.
The interesting questions, then, revolve around the way this process of
technical change actually seems to work now, where it may fail to serve the
goals of the nation, and what corrective measures are available. Such an in-
quiry helps highlight where government efforts are best put; it also brings
an appreciation of the limits of what can be achieved by the types of programs
now contemplated.
In the sections that follow we review the process of technical change as
it occurs in a sequence of corporate (and perhaps public) investments. Much
of the discussion is little more than a repetition of the "facts of life" as
we now understand them, but such a survey helps orient subsequent analysis of
the role of government in facilitating the process.
Implicit in our discussion is the assumption that most of the new techno-
logies which are likely to be commercialized in the foreseeable future will
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not be "radical" innovations, but will be improvements which are more
incremental in character.l While this assumption is not often constraining
(as will be seen) it influences our treatment of the economics of the process
of technological change. Pocket calculators may be considered a recent radical
innovation; shale oil is an example of the more incremental type we focus on.
A radical innovation is generally a new product. When a radical innovation
is introduced into the marketplace, conditions are very fluid; performance
tends to be maximized at the expense of cost and the market structure and cor-
porate organization may change rapidly as firms move in or out of the business.
Incremental innovations occur in more "mature" industries, and are replacements
for products (or processes) already in use. Thus, cost is the crucial area of
competition, and prices and market structure are relatively stable. The funda-
mental features of the process, as discussed below, are not different; what is
different is the rate of change of technology, the market structure, and pro-
duct costs.
3.1 THE NATURE OF THE INVESTMENT PROCESS
The process of technological change in the private sector can be divided
into four somewhat arbitrary phases: invention, development, introduction,
and diffusion. Because these activities cost money, and offer no immediate
return, the expenditures involved are investments, and each of the steps is
usefully thought of as involving an investment choice. That is, at each step
1The differences between the two types of innovations have been made clear in
recent work by Abernathy, Utterback, and co-workers, in The Productivity
Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the Automobile Industry, W.J. Abernathy
(Harvard University Graduate School of Business, Boston, Massachusetts, April,
1976), and "Technology, Productivity, and Process Change", W.J. Abernathy
and P.L. Townsend, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, August, 1975.
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the firm can be thought of as acquiring a new asset, where that asset is ex-
pected to yield a favorable return itself, or to open the way to some subse-
quent investment that will yield a profit.
To see the differences among these investment choices, it is useful to
look at each in a little more detail.l Invention refers to the generation of
an idea and, usually, includes some initial laboratory-scale demonstration of
technical feasibility. Basic research, which is associated with the invention
stage, is really a form of investment in the production of new knowledge.
This knowledge may not be associated directly with any current product or pro-
cess, as when investments are made in the hope that some useful invention will
result.
Development is the set of activities which takes a concept which has been
demonstrated in only a primitive form, and bring it to a condition where the
technological uncertainties are nearly eliminated. Other uncertainties--
principally concerned with the market response and government reaction--may
remain. The development stage generally involves a substantial investment
relative to that of invention. The new concept must be tested extensively,
and alternative designs must be evaluated until the concept is embodied in an
actual model that can function effectively in the working environment. This
stage usually involves a search for the most desirable combination of inputs,
performance attributes, and cost structure. Large expenditures may be involved
in the extensive engineering, construction of models and prototypes, and
1A similar delineation of the process of technological change as used in
"Federal Support for the Development of Alternative Automotive Power Systems:
The General Issue and the Stirling, Diesel, and Electric Cases", L.H. Linden,
et al, M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Working Paper No. MIT-EL 76-001WP, March,
1976. We have explicitly sought to bring together both the stages by which
new technology is developed and the stages in the "product life cycle".
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testing. For such expenditure to be "successful" it must result in a product
which management expects to make and sell at a profit.
Introduction into the market includes procurement and set-up of initial
production facilities and establishment of all the other activities necessary
to generate, support, and subsequently exploit the hoped-for market. This
may include a marketing program (advertising, demonstrations, etc.), establish-
ment of distribution channels, formation of a widespread maintenance organiza-
tion, etc. These activities may be very expensive due to the required invest-
ment in plant and equipment. The introduction stage produces knowledge of the
market's response to the new product; it also should elicit the government's
response as well, if regulatory or other interventions have been in doubt.
Very often the investment in the introduction stage is not expected to be pro-
fitable in and of itself. Accounting losses may be taken at this stage in
anticipation of gains in the operation of subsequent generations of production
facilities.
Thus a successful introduction is the prelude to the diffusion stage,
when usage becomes widespread. The early part of this stage often involves
the spread of production of the innovative product to imitators or licensees
of the first firm, as well as a build-up of production capacity by the in-
novating firm itself. If the new product is bought by purchasers in increasing
numbers, and its actual use becomes widespread, then new technology is becoming
embodied in current technique. If the innovation is a substitute for an
This occurred, for example, in the initial sales of nuclear reactors for
electric power generation. While the losses actually sustained by Westing-
house and General Electric may have been greater than anticipated, it is
clear that losses were expected--see "The Economics of Nuclear Power," I.C.
Bupp, et al, Technology Review, February, 1975.
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existing technology in use, the stock of capital embodying the older techno-
logy is retired during this process.
What makes this process go? In our society, it is the pursuit of economic
gain. The decision by a firm to make the investment required in any of the
stages of the innovation process is based on the expectation that the returns--
the incremental incoming cash flows, appropriately discounted--will be greater
than the expenditures.
At the most basic level, there is no conceptual difference between the
investment decisions made at each stage. The task of management is to allo-
cate the firm's capital to the most valuable investment opportunities. That
means finding real or intangible assets that are worth more than they cost--
assets with positive net present value--and the essential key to the decision
is the "valuation" of the asset to be acquired. But the earlier the firm
stands in the innovation process, the harder it is to specify operational
procedures for evaluation. At the last stage, diffusion, most firms use stand-
ard financial techniques, such as discounted cash flow analysis. At the first
stage, decision making is based almost wholly on judgment and intuition.
The problem is not simply the greater uncertainty faced at earlier stages.
There are important differences in the kinds of things a firm is purchasing
when it makes its choice. Once again, if we think of the investment decision
in terms of assets that are acquired by the firm, one important distinction
becomes evident. Assets required at earlier stages have value not primarily
because they are expected to produce net incremental cash flows in and of
themselves, but because they open up the opportunity to take the next step
with the technology. In effect, investment in an early stage is like the pur-
chase of an option to invest in later stages.
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The complexity of the process, and the difference in the valuation task
at each step, can be seen by reviewing each stage in turn. The payoff to
investment at the final stage (diffusion) results from acquisition of a set
of assets which generates a stream of positive expected cash flows. The
valuation process boils down to discounting the stream at a rate appropriate
to its risk. The higher the risk, the higher the opportunity cost of capital
for the asset under consideration, and the higher the appropriate discount
rate.
Many uncertainties are resolved by the time the diffusion stage is
reached. A firm can look forward to "normal" business risks--which may be
substantial in absolute terms, but still small compared to risks at earlier
stages. Once the introduction stage is past, the firm has experience in manu-
facturing and costs are relatively predictable. Buyers have observed and
evaluated the new product, so demands for it can be reasonably well fore-
casted. To the extent that regulatory, institutional, or legal difficulties
are relevant, they often have been flushed out and defined, if not resolved.
The risks at the introduction stage are greater. Technological unknowns
have been largely resolved, since the development stage has been completed.
However, actual production costs at commercial scale remain somewhat uncer-
tain--simply because production at that scale has never taken place before.
Knowledge about demand may not be so well in hand, because the product has not
yet faced the test of the market. Market surveys and other data collection
and analysis techniques can be used, but they give only partial relief. Un-
certainty about government regulations must be faced during introduction.
Environmental or other regulatory or political problems may not be resolved
until the early plants are built and the product actually used.
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A decision maker might attempt to take account of the higher risks of
the introduction stage by discounting projected cash flows at an appropriately
higher rate, arriving at a discounted present value by the usual procedure.
But such a procedure, crudely applied, misses an important aspect of the pro-
blem. The most valuable payoff to the introduction stage is the option to
make a future, diffusion-stage investment. If the introduction stage is a
success, then the diffusion-stage investment will have a positive net pre-
sent value.
A similar argument can be made if the decision is yet one step further
back in the process. The chief motive for making a development-stage invest-
ment is to acquire an option to proceed with introduction. If development
stage uncertainties are favorably resolved, the firm proceeds to the next
stage--it exercises its option. If they are not favorably resolved, the firm
still has the option to continue, but the option is not exercised.
Thus, investing in development can be thought of as acquiring an option
to purchase an option. Investment in basic research can be thought of as
acquiring an option to purchase an option to purchase an option! The early
stage investments are the first of many possible follow-on investments. Each
is a part of a complex, sequential process.
3.2 THE INTRODUCTION STAGE AND "COMMERCIALIZATION"
In terms of this simple four-way breakdown of the process of techno-
logical change, it is the introduction stage that is the target of federal
programs and proposals in the area of "commercialization". ERDA and other
federal agencies also are engaged in R&D that is more reasonably classified
with the invention and development stages, but those activities are not the
47
main focus of this study. Here the concern is with plants that are at or
near commercial scale, or with the marketing introduction of new production
under something approximating commercial conditions.
As the previous section stresses, the introduction stage is part of a
long process of investments, and is intimately tied to the prospects of pro-
fitable diffusion. Now, given that our attention is focused on introduction
and its link to diffusion, there are several other aspects of the commercial-
ization process that deserve mention. First is market differentiation. The
simple definition given at the beginning of this section might be taken to
imply that a technology is either "commercial", or it is not. But this would
be a misleading simplification of reality: Today heat pumps are commercial in
the south but not in the rest of the United States; electric vehicles are com-
mercial for the delivery of milk in the United Kingdom but not as passenger
cars anywhere; even synthetic crude oil has been and is being produced in other
countries. This is the usual course of events--technologies are almost always
used first in markets for which they are most suited. Some energy technologies
which now appear to have reasonable chances of being commercialized within the
next decade or two will most likely be utilized first in such limited markets:
Automotive gas turbines will likely see first applications in long-haul trucks
rather than passenger cars; solar heating and cooling will appear in the south-
west United States rather than the northeast, etc.
Commercial adoption therefore is not a simple transition from non-use to
use; it is part of the dynamic and complex process whereby a new concept
may penetrate some markets but not others, or where the penetration may move
at very different rates depending on prices, weather, market structure, etc.
The transition often is not a smooth one, as some initial ventures fail and
the key technical attributes are sorted out.
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Secondly, the energy technologies themselves may present very different
challenges at the introduction stage, and the role played by the first plants
may be very different. To take a simple but dramatic example, compare the
introduction of shale oil with that of solar household hot water heaters. With
the introduction of small-scale solar devices, a firm must proceed with an
effort large enough to gain reasonable economies of scale, and to sustain a
viable marketing and distribution strategy. But the investment need not be
large in relation to the size of the investing firm or the supporting capital
markets. If the introduction is successful, the firm can anticipate signifi-
cant economies of scale and "learning" in the diffusion stage.
Shale plants are different. Not only is the potential cost much greater
for each plant, both in absolute terms and in relation to operating cost, but
the expected pattern of costs in the diffusion step is very different. The
firm cannot anticipate such "learning" and scale effects with the second,
third, and fourth plants as the solar manufacturer can with a successful mar-
ket penetration. If the nuclear power industry is any precedent, subsequent
synfuels units will each involve a new design, and something of a new start
so far as "learning" is concerned. Moreover, the investment is large. If
set up as an independent corporation today, a single 50,000 barrel per day
shale oil facility would be number 110 of the "Fortune 500" when ranked by
assets.
A third consideration is the set of complex adjustments that may be in-
volved in integrating a new technology into a highly developed and inter-
related production and marketing system, where the key firms have taken on
a structure and personality compatible with the previous product mix. For
example, shale oil would involve a whole new "business", even for a major
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oil company with considerable experience in refining and petrochemicals;
the investment structure would be drastically revised; the financial and
management structures would have to change; corporate profits would be made
in different parts of the business than before; tax and regulatory issues
would arise. It is hard to do justice to the number of considerations that
would prove relevant for any particular corporation faced with such a de-
cision, but Table 3.1 shows a suggested list of the types of questions that
would have to be dealt with in the corporate planning and decision process.
An additional dimension of complexity is added when the new industry
is destined to emerge under the bright lights of public scrutiny, for one
of the competitive advantages and bases for profit normally inherent in an
emerging industry is its "mystique". When this "mystique" is removed through
the externally stimulated dispersion of know-how and the constant need for
justification to the public, the effect on the private sector's perceptions
of risks and rewards in entering the new industry are unclear, and thus the
resulting effects on the private sector's willingness to enter the new in-
dustry are unclear as well.
3.3 THE MARKET PROCESS AND SOCIAL GOALS
The previous section stress the complexity of the process of "commer-
cialization" of new technologies under our mixed market system. But the fact
of complexity does not mean that the system does not work well. Quite the
contrary. The United States stands at a point of world leadership across
many if not most fields of industrial technology, and this is the case only
because the system does work, and very efficiently.
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Table 3.1
FACTORS A LARGE COMPANY WOULD CONSIDER
BEFORE ENTERING INTO A NEW BUSINESS
Internal to the new business:
Are the margins high or low?
Is change in technology fast or slow?
Labor or capital intensive?
Unit of sale large or small?
Life cycle long or short?
Where now on life cycle?
Where is profit leverage?
How does it relate to our resource base?
What are barriers to entry?
What is the growth rate?
Where would we and competitors be on the learning curve?
Financing:
Simple or complex?
Joint ventures likely or not?
What is time distribution of cash outlay and payback?
What is cost of abort?
External to new business:
Government intervention high or low?
Competition large or small?
--what are our competitive strengths and weaknesses?
Relatedness to existing business:
Is it an extension or a diversification?
Is it significant in size?
--relative to our firm?
--relative to the industry?
How does it affect the rest of our businesses?
--how is it synergistic?
Subject to same risks, or different ones?
What parts of existing business must we protect?
--does this protect them, or add new areas that must be protected?
How would we be different with it?
--without it?
What are alternatives?
Timing:
Why now?
--now or never?
--should we lead or follow?
How would we be different if not now?
--wait, and buy in later?
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There are specific problem areas, however, where the system does not
necessarily serve the larger interests of society. Firms are led to employ
technologies that are not in the larger national interest, as in the case of
uncontrolled industrial pollution. Or there may be technologies which are
desirable from a social viewpoint, but which the private sector has no in-
centive to develop and implement. Since we entrust much economic decision
making to the market--and in general we hold to a theory of economics that
says that such market decisions will be socially desirable --such undesirable
outcomes are often referred to as "failures" in the workings of the market
system or "market failures".
Presumably, if we felt that things were going well in the area of energy
and technology, we would continue to leave the issue largely to the private
sector, as we have for two hundred years. ERDA would not be as large or as
diverse in its scope as it now is.
Given this history, and the current private-public split in the energy
sector, a useful way to organize inquiries into the federal policy in the
area of energy technology is to ask where the instances of "failure" are, and
what it takes to correct them. The question addressed in this study is of
this type, but is more narrowly defined. Here our concern is with the fail-
ures that are related to the introduction stage of important new energy tech-
nologies and with the identification of those failures that may be corrected
'Here we do not address the issues surrounding government involvement in the
earlier stages of R,D&D. For a discussion of this topic, see Energy Research
and Development, J. Herbert Holloman, et al., and Michael Grenon (Ballinger
Publishing Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975).
2There are a few notable exceptions, such as government R&D in the nuclear in-
dustry. Of course, it also is true that government activities outside the
R&D area have had a tremendous effect on the composition of the energy sector--
e.g., the interstate highway system and the tax code.
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by government subsidies of commercial demonstrations, or other efforts-to
facilitate "commercialization".
3.3.1 Energy Prices
As suggested in the simple definition of commercial feasibility at the
beginning of this section, a key determinant of the viability of any new
energy technology is the price of energy itself, and the expectations about
this price in the future. If the energy price fails to reflect the social
value of a barrel of oil supplied or a BTU saved, then a fundamental flaw is
introduced into the normal process of decision making about private investments
in new energy technologies. This is not a "failure" that can be directly cor-
rected by government efforts at commercial demonstration or related activities,
and so is outside our direct concern here. However, the energy pricing ques-
tion is critical to the whole process of technological change, most especially
at the stages of introduction and diffusion. Expected energy prices are, as
a result, especially important to the planning and evaluation of government
intervention at the introduction stage.
The situation is both complicated and uncertain, as a brief look at cur-
rent price-setting processes reveals. Energy prices certainly are not deter-
mined by simple considerations of domestic supply and demand. They are the
result of a complex set of controls by the U.S. government and foreign nations,
as well as the usual market processes. We will discuss only oil and gas, our
two "scarcest" domestic resources.
Oil Prices. World petroleum prices are set by a cartel, the members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC. The current Persian
Gulf price is $11.50 for the standard or "marker" crude; in 1969-70 the actual
market value was around $1.30, or in 1976 prices, around $1.90. At those
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prices, and higher ones in producing regions closer to market, there was
chronic potential excess capacity. Thus the cartel price is today about six
times (inflation-adjusted) a price which was above the competitive level be-
fore the cartel became effective. While in the global perspective such a
price is very inefficient, this country, and consuming countries generally,
can only treat the cartel price as an external fact, and seek the least ex-
pensive adaptation to it.
It is widely believed that the current oversupply of oil will gradually
be superseded over the next several decades by true scarcity, as existing re-
serves are replaced only at a very much higher real cost. Thus, even if the
cartel holds, the price will then be no lower, in real terms, than today.
The cartel's profit-maximizing price may be higher or lower than the current
level and thus may be changed. The cartel may run into serious trouble, and
the price may fall substantially. Or the cartel may attempt to cut prices in
selected markets to destroy competitors. Finally, the cartel may take actions
which are not motivated by economics at all, but rather by politics; in this
sense it may not play the usual rules of the game. These possibilities make
investment more risky (than at the same price without the cartel), which means
that the price necessary to draw in investment must be high enough to provide
a return above the one suitable for "normal" commercial risk. Thus, for ex-
ample, rational investors would not support a synthetic crude oil operation
whose product cost equaled the cartel price, unless that cost included a "high"
rate of return on the investment.
Until 1971, the United States limited crude oil imports through a quota
system. (The system remained in existence but without effect for two more
years.) This maintained prices in the United States above world levels. The
import quota augmented a highly complex system of regulation of domestic oil
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production. Partly it operated through the tax system. Depletion allowances
lowered the tax burden on the domestic production of oil and gas (along with
other minerals), thereby increasing the attractiveness of before-tax profits
upstream of the wellhead and drawing in capital from otherwise competitive
investment. The most important producing states, notably Texas and Louisiana,
controlled the total petroleum production, but on a per-well basis, thus
artifically stimulating drilling by individual lease-owners. This resulted
in higher investments by the industry than would otherwise have occurred.
This system has largely disappeared, succeeded by a new set of contra-
dictory features. The value to the American economy of a barrel of oil pro-
duced at home is (at least) the value of domestic resources which must be
shaped into goods and services to be transferred abroad to pay the foreign'
government-owner. This is the price of international oil delivered to the
United States, somewhat over $13 at the present time. But petroleum prices
in the United States only indirectly reflect this social value; rather they are
presently set by the complex system of petroleum price controls. Domestic
producers face prices of $5.25 for "old oil" and $11.33 for "new oil". Oil
in these classes will not be produced if it costs the operator more than
these prices, even though they are substantially below the real social value
of the oil. Buyers, on the other hand, face a price of $9.50, which is the
weighted average of these domestic supplies and imports. They then have in-
adequate incentives to conserve, as the expense avoided in not consuming a
barrel of oil is less than its social value. These prices have been estab-
lished by the federal government, not for economic efficiency but in order
to prevent a competitive disadvantage for refiners who do not own crude oil
which can still be cheaply produced; and to prevent windfall profits to the
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owners of this crude. Obviously, prices designed to regulate competition,
and do justice, cannot be expected to give the signal of value emitted under
simple competitive conditions.
National Security Premium. The social value of domestic oil is not de-
termined solely by the international price: There is also the issue of im-
port "dependence". It hardly needs to be stated that the United States is
increasingly dependent on a small group of foreign nations for our petroleum
imports. This group is well organized and may attempt to influence our foreign
policy by actual or implicit blackmail. This is a social cost which would not
be reflected in private places even if those prices were not controlled by the
government. It may be described as a "national security premium", associated
with imported oil only. Since a barrel of oil domestically produced or con-
served effectively translates into avoidance of an imported barrel, it is the
international price plus the national security premium which is the effective
social value of domestic supplies. However, while this concept seems a
reasonable one, it leaves us with, at minimum, a substantial measurement pro-
blem: How much is it worth to us to avoid importing a barrel of oil? We
defer discussion of this question to Section 5; for now, we assume that the
national security premium is large enough to be a contributing factor in the
ensuing discussion. Given the national emphasis on reducing imports of petro-
leum, this seems a safe assumption.
Natural Gas Prices. The regulation of the price of natural gas is a
longer-term and more complex form of the same problems. In the producing areas
of the southwest, natural gas is still available on intrastate shipments, at
a price which appears to have become approximately equal to that of "new"
crude oil in energy-equivalent terms, and to residual oil, but higher than
Rocky Mountain coal. Electric utilities appear to be following this signal,
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and gas is being phased out. The effective demand for new gas is limited to
the intrastate market. For many power plants, especially when located close
to areas of gas production which have no alternative pipeline connections, the
price of gas is still below that of competing fuels, and there is an incentive
to keep burning it.
Outside the producing states, the price of natural gas is only a small
fraction of the equivalent price of oil. The national ceiling is 52 cents per
million BTU, equating to about $3.12 per barrel of oil, or 7 1/2 cents per
gallon. At such prices, there is an enormous unsatisfied demand for natural
gas, the well-known "shortage". Strenuous efforts are being made to import
liquid natural gas (LNG) from OPEC members, and to manufacture synthetic
natural gas (SNG) from coal. Expected costs in the range of $20 to $30 per
barrel of oil-equivalent will apparently not attract private investment into
SNG production. Since the real resource costs of producing and shipping LNG
are considerably lower than SNG costs, the OPEC governments supplying LNG
have considerable leeway in their pricing decisions and their policies will
determine LNG availability. It is not clear whether gas consumers are pre-
pared to take large amounts at these prices, or whether in time they will
substitute away by changing their heating apparatus. In any case, consumers
will not be confronted with these high prices for a long time, for the new
sources apparently will be "rolled in" with the much lower prices of existing
interstate natural gas.
Thus producers and consumers of gas are offered multiple conflicting
price signals. Synthetic gas would cost eight times current natural gas
1There is a proposed increase now in the courts.
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prices to consumers. A gas consumer in Texas is paying, at present, about
four times the price charged to the interstate consumer for his gradually
dwindling flow for new gas; the new interstate consumer faces an infinitely
high price--it is not to be had at any price. Eventually the low price and
the infinitely high price will come together at a price which is very high
by today's standards, and higher than the price which consumers considered
when they installed their equipment.
Were there no price regulation, it is not clear that the demand for LNG
and SNG, for base loads, would exceed zero. Some 65 percent of natural gas
is in industrial uses (chiefly electrical power) where it can be replaced by
residual fuel oil and coal. If gas is to be deregulated over the next ten
years, then investment in LNG and SNG, projects which add to gas supply by
1985, may prove completely wasteful. The presently perceived "need" for
large-scale supplies of gas will turn out to be the misinformation generated
by price regulation.
Impact. The impact of the pricing regulations on investments in techno-
logical change depends on the particular circumstances involved. Any conserva-
tion technology, for example, is at a strong disadvantage due to low gas and
oil prices in domestic markets. The amount a buyer will pay for a piece of
energy-conserving equipment is directly related to the price of the energy
conserved. If the energy is a petroleum product, for example, then that
price is now being held well below the actual marginal cost of the energy to
the nation--which is the price set by the OPEC cartel. A barrel of oil saved
is valued by the consumer at the domestic price, but the savings to the
nation is the cartel price; the difference is a savings accrued by the nation
as a whole but not the individual conserver. Clearly, then, any activity
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which involves oil or gas conservation is privately undervalued. In parti-
cular, the investments in the development and introduction of new energy-
conserving technologies will be less extensive than they otherwise would be.
Energy supply technologies will be affected to an equal or lesser ex-
tent. Solar heating and cooling of homes, for example, may displace con-
sumption of refined petroleum products. In this case the impact of price
controls is similar to that on conservation. On the other hand, new sources
of synthetic crude oil, such as oil from oil shale, presently appear to cost
more than imported crude, so it is hard to conceive that an attempt would be
made to control the sales price.
The distortions caused by inappropriate energy prices apply across-the-
board to all stages of the process of technical change. Where the value of
the ultimate product of technological change is decreased by undervaluation of
domestic energy, there is a lowering of the expected returns to an investment
in any stage in the process. Naturally, the importance of the effect is very
different at different stages. At the invention stage it is the expectation
of prices several decades in the future that is important, for that is when a
new innovation would reach the diffusion stage. Needless to say, such prices
are very uncertain; therefore, they are likely to enter into the investment
calculation only in a very crude manner. The fact that the attributes of the
innovation (after any development and introduction stage) are very uncertain
as well only serves to further reduce the relative importance of prices in
decisions at the invention stage.
The impact of energy prices is very different in the diffusion stage.
There the technology is well defined, and the innovation will be adopted to the
extent that is profitable to do so. Inappropriate prices have an increasingly
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important effect as a technical option advances from invention, through de-
velopment and introduction, into diffusion.
Thus, domestic price controls create a situation where subsidies to con-
servation efforts may be socially profitable. However, government inter-
vention in support of the commercialization activities--without long-term sub-
sidies--would be limited in its impact, for the demand for such technologies,
once introduced, would remain too low. Commercialization would fail, as dif-
fusion would not occur. In such circumstances price controls and expectations
of future controls are a dominant influence on the rate and extent of techno-
logical change, and a principal force in preventing adequate private performance.
3.3.2 Failures in the Process of Technological Change
Clearly, the current process of price determination, and likely develop-
ments in the future, are an important boundary condition for all of ERDA's
planning. Much of this process is poorly understood, particularly where it is
heavily influenced by government policies and the associated domestic and
international politics. A high priority should go to efforts to understand
and analyze it. So far as U.S. domestic policy is concerned, almost any
measure to clarify the long-term price policy would be helpful, and of course
the higher the energy price that is found tolerable, the more rapid the rate
of technological change will be, regardless of federal efforts to help.
Whatever happens on the price side, however, there are a number of other
problems that may lead to a less-than-desirable level of investment in new
technology by private firms. There are several categories into which these
"failures" are conventionally gathered, and a survey of each reveals something
about the types of activities where government efforts might be most usefully
focused.
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Inability to Appropriate Technical Results. Usually, when a firm makes
an investment, it expects to capture the outputs or returns for itself; it
would prefer that the results not go to everybody, for then no competitive
advantage has been gained. Technical information is difficult to control,
however, and once it gets out any other firm may use it without paying the
originator. That is, the results are not "appropriable". In the terms used
earlier, a firm carrying out R&D may not be buying an option for itself alone,
but for all its competitors as well. The incentive to make such investments
is thus dampened, for the firms' returns from the investment are less than the
social returns--which include the profits of other firms as well as the bene-
fits consumers realize from less expensive or improved products. This is a
market failure in the sense defined above.
Of course, the patent system is designed to remedy this defect, and firms
also make efforts to protect proprietary technology which is not patentable.
But there remain substantial classes of knowledge which are excluded from the
patent system or are not readily held proprietary, or which might contribute
in widespread or unforeseeable ways to new products. One such circumstance
is basic research. Because of difficulties in appropriating the benefits of
a fundamental contribution to knowledge, government subsidies are common-
place. This type of market failure becomes less significant as a technology
progresses to later stages of development. Technical knowledge becomes
patentable, or more readily held proprietary, as the new knowledge becomes
embodied in a product.
One technique which can be used to mitigate the non-appropriability pro-
blem is the use of industry consortia to support development programs. The
firms which stand to gain from a given class of advances can join together
to finance them. Then the individual firm's proportional investment can be
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made to approximate its proportional ability to profit from the advance, and
the group as a whole can capture the bulk of the benefits. The Electric
Power Research Institute, for example, is supported by contributions from the
nation's electric utilities; it supports R&D on electric power generation
technology. However, for anti-trust or institutional reasons, it is not always
possible to organize the appropriate group.
To what extent does this phenomenon apply in the introduction stage of the
process of technological change? There are several types of information
involved. First, technological information will be developed as the product
embodying the new technology is produced and used. This information is gen-
erally reflected in decreased costs of subsequent plants. For example, it is
estimated that the first plant to produce a new type of automotive powerplant
would cost several times as much as subsequent plants of the same capacity.
The major issue, then, is the extent to which cost reductions are appropriable
by the firm introducing new technology. It is widely presumed that benefits
of this sort in fact are substantially appropriable, in contrast to the ex-
treme case of new fundamental knowledge. One argument is that knowledge is
embodied in the collective experience of the engineers and managers of the
firm, and so cannot be readily learned by outside observers. Engineers and
managers can be lured from firm to firm, but rarely en masse.
Determination of the importance of this "failure" is not a simple matter
in any particular case, and the conditions vary greatly across industries.
Therefore, continuing efforts to understand this problem are very important
1
"Should We Have a New Engine? An Automobile Power Systems Evaluation. Volume
II, Technical Reports," (Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of
Technology, Pasadena, California, August, 1975).
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to ERDA's efforts--both to identify which situations are truly blocked for
this reason, and to guide the selection of the proper instruments for subsidy.
Regulatory and Political Risk. It may be that the proprietary technical
and cost information developed at the introduction stage indicate a technology
sufficiently attractive to induce socially desirable outlays, but regulatory
and other institutional problems intervene. Important institutional, regula-
tory, and political issues posed by the new technology may be resolved only
by substantial production and use. This is true for synthetic fuels, for ex-
ample. Information about environmental effects of full-scale plants may be
inferred from pilot plants, for example, but the issue of what effluent levels
are acceptable is difficult to resolve until production is attempted on a
commercial scale. This is a special kind of distortion of private decision
making: Investment may be artificially discouraged because society has not
gotten around to specifying the rules under which the new technology will
operate.
For example, the diesel engine has special emissions problems (e.g.,
particulates) that may create problems if the engine is ever widely used in
private automobiles. As yet the emission standards to be applied to diesel
emissions have not been determined by federal regulatory authorities, and so
long as this uncertainty remains it is not in the interest of any manufacturer
to spend substantial sums of money on the introduction of the diesel engine.
Ultimate regulatory constraints may or may not be set at a level that allows
the diesel to function as a passenger car engine. But in the meantime, uncer-
tainty about regulation magnifies the risks of development. Unfortunately, it
is unlikely that the Environmental Protection Agency will start the necessary
impact studies and begin to formulate procedures for setting particulate
emission standards until diesel use becomes widespread. Similar regulatory
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barriers, or potential ones, will be faced, with greater or lesser impact,
by any important new energy technology.
This circumstance suggests that a well-designed government intervention
may be very useful. If socially valuable new technologies are blocked by the
"regulatory risks", then an off-setting subsidy may be in order. The subsidy
would not only encourage use of the technology, which is good in itself, but
also lead to a resolution of the regulatory risk and open the way to further,
unsubsidized investment in the technology by private firms. Effectively, the
subsidy would cover the private costs of developing the necessary case law,
regulatory rulings, etc. Careful study of the nature of the regulatory pro-
blem should, once again, offer guidance as to what kind of subsidy will most
effectively resolve the issue.
There is a cautionary note that needs to be sounded here. We are speaking
of intervention by the government to resolve differences created by regulatory
procedures, administrative agencies, and court rulings which, speaking loosely,
comprise the "government". Therefore, there are several issues that naturally
arise in connection with a federal subsidy program which is heavily influenced
by these considerations:
1. The barriers may be political, in the sense that there is a latent,
unresolved conflict between two or more parts of society. What are
the consequences of attempting to force an early resolution of the
conflict? What would it take to resolve it?
2. Are the risks truly "artificial" ones, reflecting no more than the
tendency of persons or organizations to avoid the effort and con-
troversy required to resolve the issue? Or does the reluctance to
decide reflect an actual lack of knowledge about the effects of full-
scale use of the new technology? In the former case, all that is
needed is for regulatory or other governmental agencies to give a
clear statement of the rules of the game. (Of course, this may be
difficult to do in a society where political and regulatory authority
is decentralized--more on this below.) In the latter case, the
building of commercial-scale facilities may or may not be the cheap-
est way to gather the needed information. (This point is also ex-
panded below.)
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Market Structure. Issues of market structure may be important in the
process of technological change. Monopoly power in any market generally is
associated with excessively high prices. Such prices would certainly have an
across-the-board impact on investments in technological change. We have dis-
cussed the energy prices above. Any other market would require a detailed
analysis of its own.
Potentially more important, and less well understood, is the impact of
market structure directly on the propensity to innovate. Simply put, large
firms may be needed to support large research and development establishments
and to risk the investments needed to introduce new technologies. On the
other hand, firms with monopoly power would seem to be under less competitive
pressure to hold costs dowa and generate innovative products. Moreover, under
competition the inducement to innovate is greater because the innovator makes
all the gains while his competition bears the losses. A monopolist must do a
private cost-benefit calculation, and may turn away innovations which would
have been profitable under competition.
For example, one situation where there is debate about the influence of
concentration on innovation is the automotive industry. The supply of auto-
mobiles to the American market is dominated by the "Big Three", with a fringe
consisting of one "independent" and a number of importers. In such a circum-
stance there are good reasons to suspect that the full play of competitive
forces is not brought to bear. On the other hand, the existence of such huge
industrial complexes gives opportunities for innovation that might not exist
were the industry made up of smaller units. There is no consensus on whether
more or less innovation takes place under current market structure or some
alternative. Government support for commercialization of new automotive en-
gines must deal with the industry structure as it is, at least making some
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effort to ensure that such support does not increase the degree of concentration.
Risk and Financial Markets. It is often argued that investment in new
energy-related technologies is blocked by lack of financing. The investments
at the introduction stage are so large, and so risky, it is argued, that pri-
vate investors are unwilling to advance the necessary capital.
Even if true, this may or may not be a "market failure". When an invest-
ment banker states, for example, that large-scale synthetic gas plants "can't
be financed", he may simply mean that the expected profitability of investment
in such a plant is not high enough to compensate for the risks that would have
to be borne. It is irrational for an investor to commit capital to the high
risk use if the anticipated return is not correspondingly large. Society as
well should demand a high expected return on capital the higher the associated
risks.
A market failure occurs when the private decision maker has a degree of
risk aversion different from that appropriate to society at large. A common
argument is that private investors are too risk averse. It is held that the
government is capable of spreading the risk of a particular technological ex-
periment over a very large pool of alternative activities, whereas a private
corporation may be limited in its ability to diversify the risk of large in-
vestment. Thus a firm would not undertake such an investment, even if its
estimate of the expected value of the investment is the same as that of the
government. In such a circumstance there is under-investment, from society's
viewpoint, in risky technologies.
On the other hand, the U.S. has a highly elaborated and efficient set of
capital markets, and these offer extensive opportunities for spreading risks.
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The combination of markets for loan funds and the various stock markets for
equity capital--supplemented by various forms of joint corporate ventures--
can serve to diversify risks very widely over the community of stock and bond
holders.l These markets appear to serve well in supporting potentially pro-
fitable investment--including very large and risky ones--in energy and in
other sectors of the economy. Thus there is no a priori reason to believe
that capital markets are demanding an excessive risk premium for investments
in new energy-related technologies.
It is true that some ventures with new technology are large from the
point of view of a single firm. If the goals of management include objectives
other than increasing stockholders' equity, then this "exposure" may be a
significant factor in the investment decision. This is likely to be the case
for a new venture by one of the many large American corporations which finance
their investments almost entirely with internally generated cash, making such
investments less sensitive to evaluation by the capital markets. But in
general the problem of corporate timidity in the face of risk does not seem a
crucial one; it is unlikely that it could long block investment in new tech-
nologies, providing that they offered profitability sufficient to attract
debt (or perhaps equity) funds from capital markets. Not all corporations or
managers are risk averse: we observe corporations, for example, investing
hundreds of millions to acquire off-shore drilling rights, even though there
1Diversification cannot eliminate all the risks of investing in new energy-
related technologies. The revenues and costs of a synthetic gas plant de-
pend on inflation, the rate of growth of the U.S. economy, the OPEC oil
price, and many other factors that affect, in varying degrees, the aggregate
value and profitability of the economy's real assets. These risks cannot be
diversified away by the individual investor or by society as a whole. In
principle, only these systematic or non-diversifiable risks are relevant in
assessing the present value of an investment opportunity.
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is a significance chance (proven by experience) of getting nothing at all.
There are two mechanisms which management can use to mitigate the risks
to the corporation. Joint ventures are widely used--for example, the major
efforts now underway to commercialize oil shale are mostly combinations of
several firms. The other approach is to organize the new venture as a separate
corporation. This provides the protection of limited liability for corporate,
institutional, or individual owners. Financing for such a venture should be
readily forthcoming if anticipated profitability is high enough to compensate
for the risks involved.
3.3.3 Prices and Other Problems: Summary
Here we have viewed the process of technological change as a series of
investments undertaken principally by the private sector. Government efforts
to spur the commercialization of new technologies constitute an intervention
in only one stage of a long and complex process. In many respects the process
itself is not well understood.
Our analysis of the relative social and private incentives to techno-
logical change in the energy sector is summarized in Table 3.2 Several fea-
tures of the table stand out. First, we have only very limited knowledge of
some of the key features of the process of technological change and, in part-
icular, the extent to which it occurs effectively without government inter-
vention. Except in the diffusion stage, where the returns to investments can
be calculated with reasonable accuracy, it is very difficult to say whether,
in any given case, resources are being allocated to the innovative process in
anywhere near the socially appropriate amounts. One is left with examining
the incentives to technological change, rather than the amount of the invest-
ment itself. Further, as indicated in Table 3.2, there are cases where even
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the direction of the effects of the incentives are unclear.
Government-supported commercial demonstrations affect only the intro-
duction stage in the process of technological change. A crucial issue, then,
is the extent to which there are market failures in that stage only, which
might be corrected. We will take this question up at some length in the
following section. An examination of Table 3.2 indicates, however, that the
non-appropriability of the benefits from the resolution of institutional pro-
blems is the only such difficulty. Other problems--energy price problems in
particular--may lead to inadequate incentives in the introduction stage. But
these difficulties apply to other stages as well, and must be examined in a
larger context.
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4. GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED COMMERCIAL DEMONSTRATION: GOALS AND MEANS
In this section we focus on government-supported commercial demonstration
programs. First the circumstances under which such programs are likely to be
both effective and socially profitable are examined. Next the alternatives to
commercial-scale demonstrations are examined. Such programs are bound to be
tangled in political and institutional problems; these difficultes are re-
viewed. Finally, we discuss the specific financial instruments which might be
considered in supporting such demonstrations.
4.1 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
In Section 2 we concluded that ERDA's goal should be to lower the cost
of substitutes for oil. This would be the result of R,D&D programs which make
new technological possibilities available to the private sector. ERDA must
perform this function within an environment which is not under its control:
Specifically, energy prices are determined by a combination of foreign govern-
ments, higher level policy decisions of the U.S. government, and market forces.
Section 3 examined the process of technological change as it normally
occurs in the private sector. Technological change is the result of a series
of investments which are made in the expectation of a suitable return. Ex-
pected prices are the key parameters, external to the firm, which affect the
investment decisions. In the early stages of the process, the relevant prices
are those expected several decades in the future. They are therefore very
uncertain, and the uncertain technological potentials are the dominant factors
in the investment decision. At the introduction stage, however, the relevant
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prices are crucial to the investment decision. There may be some techno-
logical uncertainties remaining at the time of the decision, but they are
relatively small; the cost of the new technology is reasonably well known
(usually, though not always, within 50 percent or so), and the relation of
this expected cost to the expected price is of crucial importance.
Ideally, ERDA and industry should be using the same prices in their eval-
uations of the commercial potential of new technologies. They are both est-
imating the same quantities--the market prices of the product and the key in-
puts in its production. These prices may be heavily influenced by future
government action, and may show the effects of significant market failures;
at any rate they are out of the control of both ERDA and industry. Thus, un-
less there are significant differences in technical judgment between ERDA and
industry, their evaluations of the long-run commercial potential of a techno-
logy, estimated at the point of the introduction decision, should be essentially
the same.
In most cases the long-run commercial potential of a new technology, when
evaluated prior to the introduction decision, will be independent of possible
federal interventions in the introduction stage. In most cases, the costs of
the introduction stage (which often are not recovered during that stage) are
a small fraction of the total cost of the product after introduction.l If,
when examined at the end of its development, a technology appears to be commer-
cial in the long run, it usually will be introduced and "commercialized" by the
1This is the usual case; consider synthetic fuels or a new automotive engine
for example. A possible counterexample is the SST, depending on how one
defines the stages in that case (see Appendix D).
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private sector. In most cases, ERDA commercial demonstration programs there-
fore simply do not have very much leverage. They may be useful, but they are
not often likely to be decisive in determining the fate of a new technology.
Thus, ERDA's commercial demonstration programs can be viewed somewhat
crudely as subsidies or offsets to the "introduction stage"--i.e., the excess
of cost over production revenues during the introduction stage. It may be
viewed as an "industry-front-end" cost, analogous to the usual "plant-front-
end" costs necessary to get a single plant into operation. After these costs
are sunk, the industry operates at some "long-run marginal cost".
Before these costs are sunk (i.e., at the introduction decision) private
firms will include them in their evaluations of whether or not to commercial-
ize a new technology. Where the long-run marginal cost plus an appropriate
return on the introduction cost is less than or equal to the expected price,
industry will proceed. ERDA commercial demonstration programs can reduce the
introduction cost, and therefore they may affect a firm's introduction de-
cision. ERDA's ability to influence such decisions with commercial demon-
stration programs depends on the relative magnitude of the amortized industry-
front-end cost and the expected long-run marginal cost.
Under what conditions should ERDA intervene to reduce these costs? The
answer to this question hinges on the analysis, in Section 3, of market fail-
ure in the process of technological change. There are two important circum-
stances where private industry may not have sufficient incentive to commer-
cialize a new technology, and where subsidies to the introduction stage can
be socially profitable.
The first is the non-appropriability of the technical and institutional
information generated at that stage. Because of the complex and dynamic
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nature of the markets for new products and processes, the importance of this
failure is an open issue. However, we assume that a crucial role of govern-
ment-supported commercialization is to subsidize the acquisition of this in-
formation.
The second occurs when energy is underpriced. When the expected social
value of energy is greater than the expected market price, then subsidies to
any of the stages of the process of technological change may be good invest-
ments. ERDA's forecast of the social value of energy depends principally on
projections of OPEC's pricing policies and the extra social cost of the in-
security of imported oil. The market prices of primary energy resources, on
the other hand, depend on the OPEC price and government price controls.
Thus, the second possible driving force for government-supported commer-
cial demonstration programs would not be the correction of a market failure
of the "usual" sort. Rather, it is the direct attainment of the social bene-
fits associated with domestic production or conservation of energy which is
undervalued at going market prices. In this case the introduction subsidy would
go beyond the provision of the non-appropriable technical and institutional
information discussed above.
The principal benefits which would accrue to ERDA commercial demonstration
programs are independent of which of these considerations is used to justify
the program. ERDA should subsidize the introduction costs of a technology
up to the point where its private cost at introduction just equals the market
price. Then the benefit attributable to the program is the present value of
the difference between the social value and market price for all the fuel
supplied or saved domestically as a result of the program. (Or, if the pro-
gram only accelerated the introduction of the technology, it is the benefit of
the earlier flows which must be computed.) If the total costs of the program,
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whether devoted to subsidizing appropriable or non-appropriable developments,
are less than this benefit, the program is a socially profitable one.
It would be misleading to close this discussion without reference to an
important problem which poses further difficulties of program analysis and
design. This is the problem of unintended side effects of government pro-
grams. Government subsidies to particular technologies may drive out private
efforts that would otherwise take place. Firms may decide that they cannot
compete with a heavily subsidized program; or corporate management may find
it difficult to justify large demonstration expenditures to their boards and
stockholders when they can see that the government is doing the job anyway.
Thus, on balance, federal support may lower the total resources devoted to
commercializing a new technology. Clearly, the planning of government in-
vestments in a new technology should take account of the net effect on the
entire market, not just on the firm receiving the subsidy. An automotive in-
dustry executive communicated this problem to us with the following "hypo-
thetical" example; while it refers to support of R,D&D it applies to subsidized
commercial demonstration as well:
I wonder if you have considered the following hypothetical situ-
ation in which it would appear that perhaps government participation
might be counterproductive to competition and private industry invest-
ments. Assume two automotive companies are working on a similar tech-
nology with the objective that if they are successful, they will obtain
a competitive advantage and, therefore, recover their investment with
profits. Assume now that a government agency decides that the private
effort was not as large as would be warranted by the benefits, and
therefore elects to support one of the companies with public funds.
The second company might drop its own efforts in that area on the basis
that the technology developed with the public funds would be available
to them as well as to the company carrying out the work with government
1Alternatively, it is possible for a government program to lead to an increase
in private funding. Something of the kind apparently occurred in the nu-
clear program when General Electric proceeded to accept turnkey contracts for
reactors while Westinghouse projects were being subsidized.
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support. This response to reduced competition would result in a smaller
increase in the total effort on that particular technology than had been
intended by the original government action.
I don't have a good feel for the likelihood of a response like this
example, but certainly government funding could have a significant effect
on normal competitive forces.
A related problem arises when government subsidies seem to be pending. Firms
may hold back their own projects in the hope the government will pick up part
of the tab. It seems, for example, that this may be happening in the solar
heating and cooling market at the present time (see Appendix C). Even within
the conceptual layout discussed above, this problem provides a formidable
challenge to the present state-of-the-art in the design of government programs.
4.2 ALTERNATIVES TO COMMERCIAL DEMONSTRATION
By subsidizing the construction of commercial-scale plants by private
firms, it is hoped that most technical, regulatory, and institutional dif-
ficulties associated with plants of that size will be raised, if not resolved.
Given that the tactical goal of the program is to address these uncertainties,
the choice of plant technologies, locations, etc., would presumably be de-
signed to insure that all the important uncertainties are addressed; the
resolution of these uncertainties is a principal component of the introduction
cost.
However, as with any investment, alternatives which might accomplish the
same goals at lower cost must be considered. In fact, government-supported
commercial demonstrations attempt to reduce technical and institutional un-
certainties with what might be termed a "brute force" technique. It is not
clear that the resolution of the relevant technical and institutional uncer-
tainties requires the actual construction of commercial scale plants.
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Consider first the technical uncertainties. A commercial scale plant is
one which is of sufficient size that there appears to be no great economies
gained by simply making it larger. That is, it is designed to produce the
product at a scale that is believed to be that which ultimately will prove to
yield the minimum unit cost. In any such plant--be it an automotive engine
plant or a coal gasification plant--there generally is some subsection of the
relevant process technology which is significantly different at commercial
scale than at smaller scale. If this were not true, then there would be no
economies of scale to be gained by going to the larger size, and the "commer-
cial scale" would be smaller. The crucial question, then, is whether these
limited technical subunits are so different from their smaller counterparts
that they are not readily scalable. If they are readily scalable--e.g., a
larger pressure vessel--then there are no significant technical uncertainties
which require commercial scale construction for their resolution.
There may be cases where the crucial subunit is not readily scalable--
for example, if it involves the handling of materials volumes substantially
larger than in any previous effort. In this case, then, the alternative to
building a full-scale demonstration plant is clear: build a facility only
of the crucial subunit, and no larger than that necessary to resolve the re-
levant technical uncertainties.
The case of the institutional or regulatory uncertainties is different.
The most obvious alternative would appear to take direct action to resolve
the issue. Consider again, for example, the case of particulate emissions
from automotive diesel engines. As discussed in Section 3.3, it appears that
action to set an emission standard for particulates from automotive diesel
engines will not take place until after, possibly well after, a substantial
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increase in the number of diesel-powered vehicles on the road. Thus the first
American manufacturer to engage in substantial production must face a risk that
subsequent firms might not have to face.
However, there might be ways to resolve this uncertainty which do not re-
quire the construction of large automotive diesel engine plants. Specifically,
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency could be ordered, by
the President or by Congress, to establish such a standard. He would have to
perform the studies necessary to support the sequence of decisions required
under the Clean Air Act for the establishment of automotive emissions standards.
Of course the proposal and establishment of a standard would not necessarily
resolve the uncertainty in a final manner. Just as the standards for pollut-
ants presently emitted from automotive engines are the subject of continuing
debate, so the particulate standard might be. However, the gross magnitude of
the standard, and its likely effect on engine design, would hopefully be deter-
mined. At a minimum, the debate would have been initiated.
Short of a Congressional or Presidential order, other steps might be
taken. For example, ERDA might fund the studies necessary to determine
whether or not a substantial fleet of automotive diesels would be likely to
cause a significant increase in ambient particulate levels. If not, then it
might be presumed that any emission standards would not be likely to be con-
straining, or that they might not be necessary at all. An opposite deter-
mination would also lead to a reduction in uncertainty, though the outcome
would be less pleasant for the potential manufacturers.
One can, however, imagine circumstances in which nothing short of a set
of plants would do the job. For example, it may be the case that nothing short
of a completely credible proposal for the construction of a coal gasification
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plant would force the resolution of the allocation of rights to Colorado River
Basin water. There simply may be no other way to force the relevant actors
and institutions to come to grips with the problem. Whether this is the case
in any given instance would have to be carefully analyzed. The crucial point
is that creatively designed strategies for resolution of specific uncertainties
might accomplish the same ends as a commercial demonstration program, without
the construction of complete commercial scale plants.
It is not obvious that such alternatives would be less expensive than
support of commercial demonstrations in resolving the relevant uncertainties.
Consider the simpliest possible case: a technology which would be just economic
if the institutional and technical uncertainties were resolved, but would not be
economic otherwise. The government invites proposals for the construction of
a single plant to the relevant non-appropriable information. The incentive is
a cash grant, to be awarded competitively. If there is reasonable competition,
the bids would be roughly the cost to the firms of dealing with the uncer-
tainties, i.e., the introduction cost. The firms would expect all other costs
to be recovered from sales of the product. Thus, unless it were less expen-
sive for ERDA to attempt to resolve the uncertainties directly rather than for
the contracting firm to resolve them, there would be no advantage to the direct
procedure. Of course this simplistic model misses much of the complex dynamics
of the institutional and technical problems in question, but the lesson is
clear.
In summary, in any given instance careful analysis is necessary to deter-
mine just what uncertainties are being addressed, and whether a commercial-
scale demonstration of an entire production unit is necessary for their resolu-
tion.
80
4.3 POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Even with a sound analytical basis, the implementation of commercial de-
monstration programs will face substantial political, legal, and institutional
problems. These must be carefully distinguished from those factors which are
not associated with the government's program, but rather with the actual tech-
nologies that are being demonstrated and the industries which the government
is hoping to foster. The latter problems, discussed in Section 3, are likely
to be the subject of the program.
4.3.1 Lack of Political Consensus, Division of Government Authority, and Lack
of Legitimacy
As already suggested in Section 2, ERDA's commercialization programs, like
all other aspects of American energy policy, must be implemented in a political
environment that lacks national consensus on both the definition of the energy
problems and the preferred mechanisms for dealing with it. As a result, the
political base of support for any particular commercialization program will
probably be narrow, weak, and perhaps fickle. Success at mobilizing support
(and therefore necessary resources) at any particular time will not guarantee
continuing support in the future. Even success, as measured in terms of the
successful completion of a commercial demonstration plant, could as easily
erode as strengthen the political support for the overall program. Changes in
social values may lead to a reinterpretation of a particular programmatic
success as a social or environmental failure. In the absence of assured
political support and the guarantee of independence and resources that flow
from it, the organization charged with implementing the commercialization pro-
gram is in a weak position. There will be ample opportunity to falter in one
way or another. The cost of faltering, even in a minor and totally reasonable
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manner, could well be the legitimacy of the whole program or of the organ-
ization itself.
Related to the lack of political consensus on energy issues, including
those related to commercialization, is the fragmentation of decision-making
authority within the federal government and between the federal, state, and
local governments. At the federal level, authority for setting policy and pro-
viding funding is split between the Congress and the Executive branches. There
is no reason to expect that the energy commercialization programs will escape
the sort of jurisdictional and power struggles among Congressional committees
and between those two branches of government that regularly delay or prevent
action in other energy and non-energy policy areas. Within the Executive
branch there will be conflicts among agencies and departments that have over-
lapping or conflicting responsibility for relevant aspects of energy, economic,
or environmental policy. Adversary relationships and differences in perspec-
tive may develop between such regulatory bodies as the Federal Power Commis-
sion and Environmental Protection Agency, and operating government agencies
such as ERDA. Difficulties in organizing the commercialization function are
indicated by the ambiguities in the responsibilities of the non-operating
offices within ERDA itself: the Office of the Assistant Administrator for
Planning, Analysis and Evaluation, the new Office of Commercialization, and
the newer Office of Program Integration. Possibly even more important is un-
certainty regarding the division of responsibilities between these offices and
the program divisions, which are responsible for research, development, and
demonstration, but not, apparently, commercial demonstration. The allocation
of responsibilities, the coordination of policies and the assurance of cooper-
ation among these various branches, units, and sub-units of government will be
a difficult but important task, requiring both continuing attention at all
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levels of government and adequate appreciation for existing traditions, pre-
rogatives, expectations, and power relationships.
In many instances a concerted policy on the part of the federal govern-
ment, as difficult as that will be to achieve, will not be sufficient. Re-
gulatory and decision-making authority with respect to land use policy, en-
vironmental protection, economic viability and tax burden, health and safety
facilities, and access to markets via transportation systems may all depend in
part on state and local governments and state regulatory commissions. At this
level the divergence of interest may be every bit as broad as at the federal
level. A split can be expected, for example, between those who seek the help
of outside capital to develop the industrialization of a region or local area
and those who wish to avoid the social disruption of a large influx of workers
and a major alteration of the traditional economic and social structure. This
issue has already been joined in some regions of the western coal country, and
in coastal regions near prospective off-shore oil operations.
The multilayering of government responsibility would make construction
and operation of first plants difficult enough simply because of the need to
satisfy many masters, even if the masters agreed on overall policy. In the
likely absence of such agreement, the requirements will be particularly onerous.
Still, the requirements might be manageable if only there were some societal
mechanism with nearly universal respect and legitimacy for making decisions
about new technologies and industries. Unfortunately, in the United States
today no such mechanism exists. In part this is because of the fragmentation
of authority already discussed, but it also derives from the current lack of
respect and legitimacy afforded to government leaders and institutions. This
in turn is in large measure the result of ten divisive years of Vietnam and
Watergate, and as such is by no means unique to energy policy.
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But there are additional factors at work in the energy area. For one
thing, as with other public policies involving technology, the lack of an
authentic and recognized source of technological knowledge often leads to a
lengthy and frequently bitter adversarial process.l Also, energy policy cuts
across, involves, and influences more otherwise largely independent policy
areas, and more divergent interests and more ideological perspectives, than
most other major contemporary issues of government policy.
There are several results of this absence of a national decision-making
process with political legitimacy. Not only does decision making require ex-
tended periods of time and frequently involves repeated legal proceedings, but
it also is rarely conclusive. Losers rarely accept a decision against them
as legitimate and decisive, although repugnant, and instead frequently pursue
the matter from one forum and procedure to another. As a consequence, there
is a trade-off between expediting programs and providing a wider access of
interested parties to the decision-making process.
While these issues of fragmented governmental authority and lack of le-
gitimacy in decision making have an impact far broader than ERDA's commercial-
ization activities, they are highly relevant to these programs. They raise
questions about the structure of the political process involved in reaching
decisions in this area, about the degree and manner in which various interest
groups can be given access to that process, and about the interrelationships
and coordination among various governmental entities.
The case of the supersonic transport, where technological questions inter-
acted with legal, political, and economic ones in a continuing and extended
controversy in many forums, illustrates the possibilities (see Appendix D).
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4.3.2 Instititionalization
The creation of ERDA resolved one major issue of institutionalizing the
energy technology programs: the creation of a single government agency with
primary responsibility for energy-related R,D&D. ERDA's responsibility for
commercial demonstration programs has not been so well finalized--there remain
ambiguities in the relationship between ERDA and the Federal Energy Administra-
tion, and the proposed Energy Independence Authority clouds the horizon as
well. Furthermore, both within ERDA and between ERDA and industry, the di-
visions of responsibility and authority are not yet clearly defined. The degree
of public ownership of and control over facilities built as part of the commer-
cialization program, and the legal and organizational structure of owning and
managing entities, have not yet been decided. In this circumstance the
following dilemma is common: There is a need to give operating control to
those with the greatest experience and to simulate market conditions as
closely as possible. But a concern not to "give away" taxpayers' money with
insufficient controls may lead to avoidance of market forces in favor of more
government management and control, and pollution of the data on real operating
conditions and costs.
As the commercialization programs grow in size and expenditure, consid-
erable institutional momentum and bureaucratic advocacy will be generated. ERDA
officials, Congressional backers, industrial firms, and benefitting regions
will all acquire career or other vested interest in the programs' continued
existence, strength, and growth. It will be difficult simultaneously to main-
tain effective control, program flexibility, and the ability to reduce govern-
ment involvement when industry is able to take over on its own or when the
initial justifications for government intervention have disappeared.
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One example of this type of problem is the continuing limitation on
utility liability in case of an accident at a nuclear power plant, which is
provided by the federal government through the Price-Anderson Act. This in-
tervention has been maintained well beyond the years of the nuclear power in-
dustry's infancy. The difficulties the federal government had in removing
itself from the synthetic rubber industry during the decade after World War
II testify as well to these problems (see Appendix E).
Efforts should be made to minimize these problems by appropriately de-
signing institutional and policy instruments from the beginning. Incentives
are needed for the achievement of cost-effectiveness, and periodic program
review by Congress and high-level ERDA officials at significant milestones
and decision points. Perhaps-automatic termination of some government sub-
sidies could be embodied from the start. Such measures would not guarantee
avoidance of the identified pitfalls, but they would reduce the likelihood of
being trapped in them. The overriding need is a clear commitment to limited
demonstration and information-gathering objectives.
This issue rises partly out of the lack of clarity of the relationship
between a successful demonstration and a successful industry, and an unfounded
assumption that the second will automatically flow smoothly out of the first.
In fact, this is not necessarily so, for the conditions and criteria for a
successful demonstration may well be vastly different from those for a success-
ful industry. Inherent in the market place are successes and failures, and
trials and errors; it is only after such traumas that a new industry attains
relative stability. Seldom do the industry pioneers remain as leaders in the
mature industry. If ERDA or any other government agency is to "select" pro-
jects or processes for commercialization, rather than allowing the market to
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permit them to emerge, then ERDA must assess the real risks of alternatives,
and allow those to fail which should fail by market criteria.
Underlying these issues is the fact that the U.S. government lacks not
only the tools but, fundamentally, it lacks the cultural framework in which to
effect energy policy through detailed involvement in the marketplace. Tradi-
tionally, we have looked to the marketplace to solve long-range energy pro-
blems, and to the government (primarily through regulation and tax policy) only
to see that the marketplace does not yield unacceptable environmental or dis-
tributional effects. Only in short-term crises has there been detailed inter-
vention, and we are very short on either experience or precedent for the es-
tablishment by government of long-term policy direction of the solution of
economic problems by the private sector. Other countries, of course, have
different forms of private-public intervention, and it is always possible that
fundamental changes can be wrought in the political economy of the U.S. For
better or worse, however, we appear likely to stay with the market-oriented
institutions we have. The challenge is to adapt them to this new and differ-
ent situation in the energy sector.
4.3.3 Anti-trust and the Issue of "Bigness"
In many cases it is only the large established firms that will be able
to achieve a widespread and speedy market penetration of new technologies.
For example, loan guarantees for the commercialization of a new automotive
powerplant will not bring forward a fifth domestic auto manufacturer--the
tremendous capital requirements required for such an attempted entry will not
be met, even with a partial government debt guarantee. Careful planning will
be required in such circumstances to insure that federal programs do not have
the effect of decreasing the level of competition that exists now. For
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example, this concern might lead to the funding of redundant projects, where
the advantages of competition are seen to outweigh the increased costs of
duplication.1
But this does not resolve a different issue. Inevitably, many or most of
the demonstration plants will be built with some form of subsidy by large,
well-known companies, some of whom are unfavorably regarded by important seg-
ments of the electorate. The new plants will make some very big firms even
bigger, and many persons would equate greater size with more "power". There
is a need to decide what steps we are willing to take, and can afford, not
merely to foster competition but to insure that large companies do not get
more of the program than is socially desirable. Given the current political
climate regarding the large oil companies and the tradition of strong Congres-
sional support for small businesses, this is an especially important issue.
A further anti-trust problem is that of group action. There may well be
instances where commercialization of energy technology would best be expedited
through cooperation and information exchange among the firms in a particular
industry. A prudent management would be deterred by even a low probability of
a finding of criminal violation, or even a moderate probability that a suit
would be filed, with the accompanying publicity. Yet the anti-trust agencies,
if they could devote adequate time to the problem, might see no violation.
The problem is basically one of fact: Will the proposed group activity have
any undesirable effect on supply and market price? In order to avoid the
harmful results of uncertainty about the government's actions, it would be well
to seek anti-trust clearance at an early stage.
1 See Economic Strategy for Developing Nuclear Breeder Reactors, P.W. MacAvoy
(M.I.T. Press, 1969) for a detailed evaluation of the breeder reactor case
where he reaches just this conclusion.
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The "bigness" problem is not new, and has been often resolved in par-
ticular cases. A satisfactory way of handling it may be difficult to obtain
at the present time. However, as discussed above, the situation depends on
a variety of essentially political factors that bear little or no relation to
the importance of such an exemption to the success of new technologies.
4.4 MECHANISMS OF SUPPORT
The institutional problems inherent in a commercial demonstration program
are, as we have seen, formidable. The latter must be taken into account, how-
ever, in the choice of instruments for subsidizing commercial-scale plants.
This is the issue we now address: How should the government go about providing
the incentives which will result in the construction of the plants?
4.4.1 General Considerations
We have argued that the purposes of government-supported commercial de-
monstration projects are principally (1) to support the development of the
information associated with the resolution of the technical and institutional
uncertainties concerning new energy technologies, and (2) to provide a sub-
sidy to foster the introduction of such technologies when they are being re-
tarded by inappropriate energy prices. With these goals in mind, some general
considerations of program design can be laid out.
Both goals lead to an argument that commercial demonstrations should be
conducted in such a way as to simulate the normal workings of the private
sector--i.e., the influence of the subsidy should be as small as possible and
still lower the costs of the actual demonstration to the point where it will
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go ahead. This implies that the participants in the program should be those
who would be dealing with the technology under circumstances of widespread
use, and that the incentive structure associated with their participation
should approximate that which they will face after the government program is
over.
The choice of industrial participants must focus on those firms which
show the clearest promise for long-term involvement in the industry (taking
into account the "bigness" issue). As stated by the recent Rand study:
"Demonstration projects that enjoy greater diffusion success are those opera-
ting with a strong technology delivery system. These firms will have the
incentive to make the technology a long-term economic success. Furthermore,
the very prospect of such success will stimulate the initiation of the rele-
vant regulatory and institutional proceedings.
The importance of a careful choice of industrial participants can be seen
when we considered that there are strategies that would be profitable to some
segments of industry, but would fail to accomplish the goals of commercial
demonstration. That is to say, the construction and operation of government-
supported demonstration plants can be seen as a business in itself quite apart
from the ultimate development of viable industries. For example, if the
variance in construction costs is very high (as may often be the case), sub-
stantial profit at low risk is possible for construction operating on a cost-
plus basis; this fact will tend to attract much interest in the construction
of demonstration plants, beyond that stemming from the prospect of their
future profitable operation.
"Analysis of Federally Funded Demonstration Projects: Final Report" (The
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, April, 1976), Report R-1926-DOC,
p. 51.
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Thus the federal program should provide the project managers with a
structure of incentives which differs as little as possible from that which
they would face in an unsubsidized circumstance. This is important with re-
spect to the choice of the mix of input factors--especially capital as com-
pared with labor, transportation, maintenance, etc. Similarly, the incen-
tives with respect to risk-taking should be as realistic as possible.
There also is a need to foster the spread of the appropriate learning
involved in the first few plants and to stimulate competition in the field,
and here there will be a trade-off between the number of firms involved and
the cost of the program. This trade-off, while clear conceptually, is dif-
ficult to evaluate analytically. Many of the issues addressed in Section 5
are relevant, in that the linkages between the government's program and the
rate of technological substitution are not well understood; in particular,
not much is known about the importance of having a number of firms involved,
as opposed to just one.
Clearly any commercial demonstration program must be carefully branded
as such. Projects must be chosen so that early government subsidies to pri-
vate firms can be turned off when the demonstration has been completed.
There is a "slippery slope" here, on which commercial demonstration programs
may slide into long-term subsidies. Likewise, the government agency must
have a clearly bounded authority, and a sense that its mission is accomplished
when the demonstration projects are set up and the industry is ready to stand
or fall on its own. Avoiding the "slippery slope" should be an important
consideration in choosing subsidy mechanisms, though it is difficult to sub-
ject this effect to precise analysis.
Simiarly, there is a need for flexibility in program design. One of the
principal goals of commercial demonstration programs is the development of
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information which is crucial to the long-term success of the new industry, and
it follows that this information may have important implications for the
demonstration program itself. For example, a technology might be expected to
be economically viable in the long run, while the requirements for environ-
mental production are uncertain. During the course of a demonstration the en-
vironmental uncertainties might be clarified in a way that drove costs out of
the range of economic feasibility. Obviously at that point there would be
little utility in continuing the demonstration program (although of course,
more fundamental research and development might well continue), and it is im-
portant to design subsidies that can be shut off in such a circumstance.
Finally, in order that the program be subjected to careful scrutiny, fi-
nancing mechanisms should be used which reveal the full costs of the program.
Indeed the full cost is one of the most important things the demonstration
should be designed to determine. There will of course be large uncertainties
in estimates of both the costs and the benefits of such programs. But, as
discussed below, some demonstration schemes provide greater visibility of
cost than others. Clearly, if the extent of the subsidy is not well known,
then the cost of the technologies output cannot be readily calculated. If
this is the case, then an uncertainty of major significance will remain.
While the true (total) cost of the project from a subsidized commercial
demonstration plant may be determined by this type of program, the long-run
cost may not be developed in any case. As discussed above, the cost of the
demonstration plant is likely to be higher than that of subsequent plants--
otherwise the commercial demonstration program would be of little utility.
On the other hand, a firm planning to use the subsidized demonstration plant
as a foothold in a new industry may well sell the plant's product below cost
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(even counting the subsidy), expecting to make back its losses on subsequent
profits in the industry. Once again, the complex dynamics of the commercial-
ization process may make analysis difficult.
4.4.2 Financial Instruments for Supporting Commercial Demonstration Projects
After weighing the general considerations discussed above, a specific
program format and set of financial instruments must be chosen. The proper
selection and design of the subsidy mechanism may differ from industry to in-
dustry, technology to technology, and even from project to project; and there-
fore a detailed analysis of the issue is beyond the scope of this study. It is
possible, on the other hand, to make some general observations about the differ-
ent approaches.
We begin with loan guarantees, which we have looked at in greater detail
than the others because of the large-scale programs currently being proposed,
Our discussion of this mechanism indicates the types of issues that need to be
better understood about all forms of subsidy. We also look briefly at regu-
lated utilities which can be used as a subsidy mechanism, and comment on tax
expenditures, direct government expenditures, and price guarantees.
(i) Loan Guarantees
Loan guarantees are a widely discussed commercial demonstration incentive
because, among other things, they provide an off-budget form of financing.
However, the use of loan guarantees has been subjected to very little analysis,
particularly of their true costs and some of their subtle incentive effects.
A loan guarantee appears to be free to the government. When it is estimated
that there is a small probability of default and, with a small number of plants,
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it appears there might be no budgetary cost at all. But this does not mean
that the guarantee is costless to the society. Obviously the principal effect
of the guarantee is to shift capital from other less risky projects into the
guaranteed project, making capital slightly more expensive for all competing
investments. The government has done this by absorbing the risk of default,
and the cost is distributed throughout capital markets. The problem of analyzing
just what this cost actually is makes the use of this incentive very difficult
to evaluate. (We make some suggestions about possible approaches to the pro-
blem in Section 5.)
There are other effects as well. Subsidizing risky ventures by means of
debt guarantees induces high debt ratios. If privately financed as independ-
ent ventures, they would use very little debt.l If this avoidance of debt is
rational, then one must presume that there are costs of inducing ventures to
operate at unusually high debt ratios. This may induce inappropriate operating
and investment decisions. Two examples follow.
(a) The existence of risky debt creates a disincentive for follow-on
investments. Few ventures operate forward on one initial capital outlay.
Follow-on investments are often required for expansion, to cope with unexpected
difficulties, etc. These follow-on investments are undertaken because they
generate a net increase in the present value of the firms' assets. However,
iThey might be undertaken directly by firms which already have substantial
debt outstanding. But the new venture would not be regarded as "supporting"
any substantial amount of additional borrowing.
2It might be argued that risky ventures operate at low debt ratios for the
simple reason that investors do not wish to hold risky debt. If this is the
only reason then there is no harm in debt guarantees. But there is no reason
why risk per se should preclude a market for a firm's bonds. There is an ample
market for convertible bonds, for example, which in many ways are similar to
straight bonds with a high probability of default. That is, in each case the
bonds' market values are highly sensitive to changes in the values of the firm's
assets.
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the existence of risky debt weakens the incentive for the owners of the firm
to make such investments, because part of the increase in asset value is cap-
tured by the investors who hold the risky debt.
To take a concrete example, suppose that technical programs are discovered
in the initial production runs of a synthetic oil plant. The owners can live
with the problems or make a substantial additional investment to solve them.
Under normal circumstances the owner would simply ask whether solving the pro-
blem increased the plant's present value by more than the investment required.
However, in this case there is a large amount of risky debt outstanding, with
the government bearing the risk. If the investment is made, the value of the
plant increases, and the unguaranteed value of the debt increases also. The
government is clearly better off if the additional investment is made.
But if the government captures, say, 20 percent of the value created by the
additional investment, that leaves only 80 percent for the plant's owners. They
put up 100 percent of the incremental outlay and get only 80 percent of the in-
cremental gain. The incentive for them to make sensible investment decisions
is correspondingly weakened. The percent of the increase in asset values cap-
tured by lenders depends on how risky their debt is. The riskier the debt the
more they capture, and the weaker the incentive for economically sound follow-on
investments.
This problem of warped investment incentives exists for any risky debt,
whether or not government guaranteed. It is not usually serious, since lenders
are careful not to purchase debt claims when there is a high probability of
default. They are particularly cautious when the probability of payment is
likely to depend on further discretionary outlays by the firm's owners. Lenders
recognize that the owners may choose not to advance cash for those outlays, and
protect themselves accordingly.
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The problem is likely to be much more serious for ventures in commercial-
ization. The offer of debt guarantees will induce debt ratios as high as those
of the largest regulated utilities. Yet the underlying assets are viewed as
unusually risky even for unregulated firms. The debt of such a firm is, absent
the guarantee, a speculative instrument. Consequently the incentive effects
will be strong, and very likely improper from an economic standpoint.l
Where there is a disincentive for follow-on investment, there is also an
incentive for disinvestment. That is, owners gain by liquidating assets and
paying dividends. The value of the firm declines by the amount of dividend
paid, but part of the decline is "captured" by the risk debt. Bondholders incur
a capital loss, because the assets securing their claim are less valuable. This
capital loss is the owners' gain. The value of equity declines by less than the
cash dividend received.
Similarly, equity gains if additional debt can be issued later in the
venture's life. Any increase in the venture's debt ratio increases the risk of
initially outstanding debt and causes a capital loss to the initial lenders
(to the government, in this case).
This suggests another difficulty with loan guarantees. In normal private
financing, bond indentures are carefully written to preclude the kinds of man-
euvers just described. Dividend payments and additional debt issues are re-
stricted, as well as a variety of other strategies that would have the same
1There are various ways of alleviating the incentive effects, but none seem to
apply here. For example, the follow-on investment could be part debt financed.
Since the additional debt dilutes the government's claim on assets, the new
financing could be arranged to leave the government's position unchanged. Who
would buy the additional debt? The reason we need the government guarantee is
that private markets avoid debt when it is as risky as the debt we are con-
templating here. The government could guarantee the new debt as well, of
course, but we doubt ERDA is willing to assume any such open-minded commitment,
in which the firm can come back for more subsidy any time a follow-on invest-
ment is contemplated.
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effect.l
Moreover, private lenders monitor the firm's actions to check for actions
that violate the spirit or the letter of the indenture provisions. The in-
denture restrictions and monitoring reduce the likelihood of the behavior de-
scribed above. But with a government guarantee, private lenders have no in-
centive to work out appropriate indenture restrictions or to monitor the ven-
ture being financed. Moreover, the proposed procedure for loan guarantees con-
tains no explicit equivalent procedure. If indenture restrictions and monitoring
are no one's responsibility, then we can expect the various incentive effects
described above to operate unchecked in commercialization ventures.
(b) Loan guarantees encourage high risk technology and operating procedure.
It is no doubt obvious from what is said above that loan guarantees are worth
more to risky ventures than safe ones. The riskier the asset, the larger the
different between the guaranteed and unguaranteed value of the debt claim, and
the larger the subsidy. Similarly, the loan guarantee creates an incentive for
a commercialization venture to be operated by risky strategies rather than safe
ones, and for concentrating follow-on investments in relatively risky assets.
Anything that makes outstanding debt riskier benefits the venture's owners,
other things equal. Finally, the loan guarantees should encourage owners of
commercialization ventures to set them up as separately incorporated ventures,
so that there are as few assets securing the debt as possible. This maximizes
The disincentive effect of risky debt on follow-on investment is harder to
prevent by indenture provisions, since it is difficult for any outsider to
determine what the firm's investment opportunities are, or whether any par-
ticular opportunity has a positive net present value.
2If only the spirit is violated, lenders nevertheless have options open. For
example, it is often possible to find a technicality justifying the lenders in
declaring that the loan is in default.
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the value of the loan-guarantee subsidy, and reduces the owners' exposure and
commitment to the venture.
Of course these incentives exist in private financing as well, but they
are magnified by the extremely high debt ratios contemplated in the commercial-
ization program, and by the apparent lack of concern for developing appropriate
indenture restrictions and monitoring.
Consequently, the subsidy inherent in loan guarantees is not neutral. It
favors high risk investment and operating strategies. Now it might be argued
that this is exactly what ERDA wants. It is true that the technologies ERDA
chooses to support in commercial demonstration will be risky ones--for reasons
we have discussed. Here, however, we are dealing with distorted incentives to
the operator given the technical option which is subsidized. Under these cirn
cumstances a neutral effect of the support is the desired attribute.
(ii) Financing by Regulated Utilities
A number of important energy industries are under price regulation, and this
circumstance offers an opportunity for financing demonstration projects--mainly
for the regulated industry itself, but not necessarily so limited. In most of
these industries, such as natural gas or electric power, the price is set on the
basis of average cost of supply. This makes it possible to finance small in-
crements of extremely high cost energy supply, for when rolled into the overall
rate structure the price effect felt by consumers is not very great. Of course,
managers of regulatory utilities operate under a mandate to serve customers at
least cost and normally they would not adopt (nor would regulatory conditions
allow them to adopt) supply technologies which were significantly more costly
than available alternatives.
In certain cases, however, price regulation can lead to a circumstance
98
where technologies of almost any cost might be financed (and gladly) by regu-
lated utilities. This occurs in the case of natural gas, for example, where
the price of gas in interstate markets is being held below either the price
of gas within the producing states or the price of alternative fuels at the
point of consumption. As a result, very little new gas is being committed to
interstate markets; reserves committed to these markets are declining; and
consumers face a choice of switching from cheap gas to high priced oil.
Utilities do not really have an option to bid for moderately priced gas. Where
excess demand is created by price regulation in this manner, it would be possible
to finance a very high cost addition to supply.
Thus these regulatory procedures offer an opportunity to finance commercial
demonstrations, and in this circumstance two issues arise: one involves ef-
ficiency and the other equity. First, the fact of active consumer desire for
the output of a demonstration facility may give a strong push to the use of this
particular situation as a demonstration format. Given the likely difficulties
in subsidizing demonstration activities by the instruments listed above, it
is possible that a significant bias might be introduced into the commercializa-
tion program. Technologies and schemes might be financed which are not the most
efficient in terms of their ability to open up new options for the country as a
whole.
The second issue is the one of equity. Since the knowledge gained by such
a demonstration will benefit the nation, it can be argued that the burden of the
subsidy of the initial demonstration ought to fall on the nation's taxpayers.
If demonstrations are financed by rolling the cost into the rates of a particu-
lar regulated utility, then the burden of the demonstration (and the risks of
very high cost) are targeted specifically to the consumers of that utility sys-
tem. As noted earlier, larger issues of utility rate regulation, which lead to
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significant excess demand, may create a situation where the utilities seek these
projects since they cannot satisfy their excess demand otherwise. Nevertheless,
the issue remains as to whether the resulting distribution of economic impact
among the customers is a desirable one.
(iii) Tax Expenditures.
A widely discussed method of subsidy is to lower taxes on a given kind of
investment, by tax credit or accelerated depreciation. It appears to be cost-
less because the sudsidy does not enter the federal budget. (Of course, the
burden is reflected in taxes foregone.) This method seems to be preferred by
a number of large corporations who are considering synthetic fuel plants.1
Tax expenditures suffer several disadvantages, under the criteria laid out
above. First, because the subsidy is indirect, its magnitude may be very hard
to identify. One of the most important objectives of a demonstration (i.e.,
information about cost) is lost. Moreover, the most common forms of tax ex-
penditure for the types of investments involved here are the investment tax
credit and/or accelerated depreciation. Both are subsidies to capital--as
opposed to materials and labor cost--and therefore they introduce a bias into
the selection of factor inputs.
Finally, there is an important institutional problem. It might prove
very difficult to target tax expenditures to a small number of particular de-
monstration plants; the subsidy might end up being applied to many projects
that were not part of the R,D&D program. Also, in the past it has proved very
1
"Response to Questions on Government Incentives for Synfuels Plants," Exxon,
U.S.A., in Loan Guarantees for Commercial-Size Synthetic Fuels Demonstration
Plants, Volume III (U.S. House of Resentatives Committee on Science and
Technology, September and October, 1976, No. 36), p. 2834.
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difficult to turn off tax expenditure programs, even after their original
justification had faded from the scene.
(iv) Direct Government Expenditures
Other methods of subsidy include sharing of cost between governments and
private companies, direct grants to builders or operators, or government con-
struction with private operation and an eventual sale (or offer of first re-
fusal) to the private operator. One finds examples of these methods in World
War II. Unfortunately, one cannot claim that there is any "usable past" from
which to draw lessons. Appendix D examines the case of synthetic rubber during
World War II. It is shown there that that experience bears little relevance to
the present problem because of the undeniable "gaps" that had to be filled at
"any" cost, and the many economic controls that characterized the war-time
years. That data do not exist to support serious analysis of the efficiency
of the effort, in spite of the fact that in meeting its own goals the program
was widely judged to be a success. Direct cash grants have the obvious ad-
vantage of making the extent of the subsidy clearly visible and of not biasing
input factor choices. On the other hand, direct government construction and
ownership, even if followed by sale to private industry, does not simulate the
market situation.
(v) Price Guarantees
A price guarantee has the great advantage of leaving the private firm free
to design the demonstration plant as it wishes, in order to minimize total out-
lays and maximize profits. Thus market situations are minimally distorted.
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Furthermore, the extent of the subsidy is very visible, allowing the clearest
calculations of the full private cost of the product.
These characteristics make the price guarantee a very attractive instru-
ment, under the criteria laid out above. Of course, there are many ways to
design and manage such schemes, as there are with all these approaches, and
their detailed formulation would depend on the facts of the particular program.
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5. EVALUATION AND PLANNING
The previous sections reviewed the nature of the investment process
by which most technologies are adopted in our economy, and surveyed the situ-
ations where government intervention may be called for and the policy instru-
ments available. Next, we come to the issue of how federal officials can
evaluate alternative situations which appear to call for intervention, and
the procedures by which the year-to-year activities might be planned and
monitored.
To study the problems that arise in connection with this evaluation
and planning task, we will go through a two-part discussion. First, we
explore the nature of the evaluation problem and how, in principle, cal-
culations and judgements might be made. As is evident from the discussion
in the preceding sections, the possible technological and market circum-
stances that such evaluations have to cover are very complex. Therefore, to
facilitate the discussion of the analysis issues, a set of simple examples
is used. Second, based on this layout of the evaluation problem, we consider
the key steps in the required analysis and the availability of the techniques
to perform the tasks that are implied. This inquiry leads to a set of areas
where additional research and empirical analysis is needed to support at-
tempts to evaluate and plan federal programs.
It should be repeated at the outset that our focus is on the evaluation
problems as they present themselves at the stage of commercial demonstration
or "commercialization" of new energy technologies. ERDA also faces a larger
planning and evaluation task which includes decisions that must be made about
expenditures on development of various technologies and on basic research or
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invention-type activities. Consideration of the larger planning, analysis,
and review problem of such a federal agency is outside the scope of this
study. However, it is hoped that the discussion of issues that arise at the
introduction stage, and the evaluation techniques that may be applied there,
will cast some light on similar tasks that need to be carried out for the
ERDA strategy as a whole.
5.1 A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE INTRODUCTION STAGE
To facilitate discussion of the analytical problems that arise, a num-
ber of simplifying assumptions are called for. The resulting prototype situ-
ation will allow us to raise most of the conceptual issues that must be faced
in constructing an evaluation methodology. Naturally, the basic approach
outlined here would have to be modified to suit the special characteristics
of particular technologies or market circumstances. The following is a for-
mal summary of the economics of the process of technological change, as dis-
cussed in previous sections.
We assume that there is a particular technical option which has passed
through the development stage, as defined in Section 3. A choice is now faced
as to whether it should be introduced into commercial use. The technology,
when put into use, produces an output of energy in each year of the future
which we may denote by the variable x. This product may be energy produced by
a new supply technology, such as shale oil or solar heating; it may also be thought-
of as energy saved by some new utilization device, such as a new automotive
engine. From time to time during this discussion of these three examples--
shale oil, solar household heating, and advanced automotive engines-- will be
used to illustrate the application of the analysis to different types of cir-
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cumstances. Further, it helps to assume that several other conditions hold
true:
1. There is only one market in which the good is sold. That is,
there are no complex sets of markets differentiated by weather
or geography. Furthermore, the demand for the technology is
a simple function of price: there are no considerations of
consumer acceptance apart from cost as price (as might be the
case, for example, if solar collectors were cheaper than other
methods of space heating, but consumers did not like the looks
of them).
2. The technology produces only one well-defined product, such
as synthetic oil gasoline saved, or Btu's in home heating.
Many technologies, of course, produce a variety of products,
and to simplify the example we will leave those aside.
3. The process of technical change can be summarized along the lines
laid out in Section 3 and shown in schematic form in Figure 5.1.
The technology has been through the development stage and the
firm faces an introduction decision. We define a clear step
in the evolution of the technology which is referred to as "in-
troduction". After the introduction into the market, new data
will be available about the technology and its market pro-
pects, and at that point a new set of decisions will be made
as to whether the technology ultimately diffuses through the
market.
As it is evident, these are dramatic simplifications of reality. The in-
troduction stage is an abstraction which may or may not be well distinguished
from the processes of development and diffusion. However, since the federal
programs under study here are concerned with this specific stage, this pro-
vides a useful way to focus on the decision to subsidize commercial demon-
strations. Particular circumstances may involve more complex mixes of pro-
ducts and market circumstances, but these complications are best withheld
until it is evident that headway can be made in the evaluation task in this
more simplified circumstance.
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5.2 THE NATURE OF THE EVALUATION PROBLEM
5.2.1 Elements of the Private Investment Decision
The various elements of the evaluation problem are laid out in Figure
5.1. We introduce some algebraic notation in the figure and accompanying
text, but the symbols are no more than a shorthand. The logic is the same if
the problem is to be approached with an elaborate set of analytical models
or simply with common sense and a few key data elements. As shown in the
figure, the circumstance is comprised of several elements. First, as noted
earlier, the technology produces an output which we define by the variable x,
or xt when we speak of energy in some particular year t. For a shale oil
plant we may speak of a facility that produces x barrels of oil in a year. Sol-
ar heating produces Btu's of heat directed to domestic heating, and that case
x reflects the actual energy delivered. In the case of a new automobile engine,
x can be taken to represent gallons of gasoline saved. While more precise
definitions would be required before an adequate set of calculations could
be made, these will suffice for our purposes.
When these technologies have diffused and are in wide-scale use, the
energy delivered and saved, x, will have some cost. This we refer to by the
symbol C(x).1 Of course at the time of an introduction decision, no one
knows what that ultimate cost will be, but the dimensions may be stated in
terms of ultimate dollars per barrel of the shale oil, cents per million
BTU of the energy into household heating, or cents per gallon of gasoline
'Note that C(x) is the cost after the experience of commercial introduc-
tion and after some diffusion has taken place. This means that the term
C(x) may involve learning effects and a host of other phenomena. We omit
them here to simplfy the discussion.
107
Figure 5.1
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saved. Since this is a representation of the firm's investment decision,
these costs are private costs only.
Although C(x) is not known at the point of the introduction decision,
there is some expected cost of the technology which may be calculated on
the basis of data obtained in the development stage, and using other in-
formation about market conditions, regulatory prospects, legal difficulties,
and the like. As shown in Figure 5.1, we refer to the probability distri-
bution of ultimate costs by the symbol G i[C(x)]. In the case of a shale oil
plant, for example, the distribution of likely ultimate costs may be very
broad if the technology has not been tried at large scale. A typical range of
values, given that regulatory difficulties are not expected to intervene, may
be from $15 per barrel to $35 per barrel. Under some regulatory circum-
stances, this distribution might extend to much higher values (or even to an in-
finite cost which would reflect a case where the technology was proven scial-
ly unacceptable).
The industries that are concerned with this technology have the in-
formation contained in G i[C(x)] as a result of their own development work
or various federal R&D programs. They may take the next step in the tech-
nology change process by introducing the technical options into the market.
In the case of a shale oil plant this would be to build the first commercial
scale plant, or set of such facilities. For solar heating, the introduction
step would involve the establishment of a commercial scale manufacturing
facility and the setting up of the marketing apparatus necessary to fully ex-
plore its potential. As shown in Figure 5.1, we talk of this step as involving
a net introduction cost, K . This is the net investment in the introduction
1These numbers are strictly hypothetical. We discuss actual costs in
more detail in Appendix A.
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stage, as discussed in Section 4.1. Introduction produces a set of
facilities which can produce the annual energy product x*, each unit of
which costs an average of C*(x*). Thus Kn equals the gross capital in-
vestment of the introduction stage, Kg, minus the net revenues produced
from the sale of the annual production x* (all carefully discounted).
Using the language developed in Section 3, a firm buys two things if
it decides to make the expenditure K:
(a) It buys the capacity to carry out production using the facili-
ties built at the introduction stage, and to sell the resulting
product in the market.
(b) It purchases the option to go into production for the diffusion
stage if the conditions indicate.
Of course, the results of the introduction decision may be fortunate or un-
fortunate depending on the circumstances. It is possible that the facilities
built at this stage will make a profit in and of themselves, and will lead
the way to a profitable diffusion. Alternatively, and more likely, the in-
vestment K may not yield a reasonable rate of return if considered alone
g
(that is, the first plant loses money). However it still may be a good in-
vestment because the option that comes along with it is sufficiently profitable
to cover the introduction losses; that is, the value of the option is greater
than K
n
A more unhappy outcome would be where the results of the introduction
were so unfavorable that plans for diffusion were abandoned. That is, an
option to go on is made available by the investments at the introduc-
tion step, but the option is not taken up because its expected value is
negative. An example here would be a solar heating option which was
expected to achieve significant economies in scaling up to a commercial
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size plant, but where these economies were not in fact realized for reasons
not fully foreseen before the introduction stage. As a result the resulting
heating system is too expensive to capture a significant part of the house-
hold market.
The information available after the introduction has been tried is
indicated by the distribution Gd [C(x)] in Figure 5.1. This is a new proba-
bility distribution of costs of the recently marketed technology, and it is only
available after investment in the commercial introduction step (and the net
expenditure of K has taken place).
When a firm is making decisions about whether to invest in diffusion
given Gd[C(x)], or to invest in introduction given Gi [C(x)], a key factor
in its calculations is the expected market price of energy over the relevant
time horizon--the "planning price" previously discussed. This we will
m 
refer to as P. This price is, of course, uncertain. A separate price
t
which will enter in other calculations is the social value of energy, which
we denote here by P. This price or value is not of relevance to the pri-t
vate decision maker, though it will enter into the types of calculations that
would be made by a federal agency in deciding what subsidies are warranted,
as discussed below.
There are additional observations that are worth making about the re-
lationshop between Gi[C(x)] and Gd[C(x)]. In general, one hopes that each
stage of investment in R,D&D--including the introduction stage--will lower
the ultimate costs C(x) that are going to be'experienced with a particular
Throughout this discussion we simplify the market circumstance by talking
as if there were a single energy price. There are, of course, a whole
structure of prices depending upon the area of the country and the par-
ticular product involved. Calculation of such prices may offer its own set
of difficulties, but there is a common exercise and adds no conceptual prob-
lems to the issues already under discussion here.
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technology. But note that in this case both these expressions reflect
expectations about what the ultimate cost of the technology will be after
the diffusion stage has been entered. Thus, viewed from the standpoint
of the introduction decision, there is no reason to suppose that the ex-
pected values of these two distributions of costs will be different.
The shale oil example can serve to elaborate this point. Before a firm
would introduce a plant at commercial scale, it would have some estimate of
its expected cost in large-scale application in many plants. After it in-
troduced the first round of plants, it would have some revised expectation
of the cost of that technology over the 20 or 30 plants to follow. But
at the point of introduction decision, it has no basis for knowing why this
cost should be different after the experiments than before. Of course, it
will be different in fact. But what we mean by the expected value of Gi[C(x)]
is precisely the best guess about what the cost will be after diffusion.
On the other hand, the firm will have opinions as to the likely changes
in the dispersion of costs between an estimate at the introduction decision
and an estimate after the introduction has been tried. Much of the justifi-
cation for any federal involvement in the commercialization process, and in-
deed much of the justification for any corporate investment at this level,
is that the net investment of Kn and the experience of the introduction ex-
periment itself will serve to reduce the variance of G[C(x)]. This is what
one means when it is said that the first commercial-scale plants will resolve
uncertainties about scaling laws, environmental restrictions, labor problems,
etc.
Of course, it should be noted that it is always possible that the variance
in likely outcomes could increase. This would happen when the introduction
experiment discovered new sources of uncertainty which were not foreseen at
the time the estimates Gi[C(x)] were made.
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5.2.2 The Decision Faced by a Private Firm
With this simple model of the introduction and diffusion stages, we can
review what was said earlier about the decision faced by a private firm.
At the time of the introduction decision, the firm has a probability dis-
tribution of the ultimate costs of the technology in diffusion, Gi [C(x)].
It also has the prospect of an investment (Kg), that will lead it to the
diffusion stage. The firms faces what was earlier called an "investment
choice". The expenditure K will be a good investment if the total of the
returns from the diffusion stage (which may be zero if diffusion is not
indicated) and the returns from facilities built during the introduction
stage are sufficient to cover the cost K . This calculation, of course,
m
is ultimately dependent on what the firm takes as its forecast of P and
t
how uncertain the cost forecast is.
Naturally, the value of the diffusion option which is being purchased
must be sufficiently high to allow for the riskiness of investing K . If
g
the current estimate of ultimate costs and prices, G [C(x)] and pt, are
highly uncertain, then the introduction investment is very risky and must
have an expected return which is high enough to draw the firm's resources
away from other investments.
In general, when such an investment is not made it is because the
returns expected if the diffusion stage were entered are negative. This would
be the case, for example, for a shale oil plant where the mean of G i[C(x)]
is $25 per barrel and the expected value of P is only $15 per barrel. Or
t
such would be the case for water heating where the cost of energy from the
solar device to be $15 per million Btu and cost of alternative energy (say.
from a gas-fired water heater) to only $3 per million Btu. Alternatively,
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the expected value of returns in the diffusion stage may be positive, but
the costs of the introduction stage alone may be so great as to make the
overall prospects unattractive (i.e., the expected net present value of in-
troduction is negative).
On the other hand, as noted in Section 3.2, there are circumstances
where the market system may "fail" in the sense that corporate decisions
at this stage are based on considerations which do not reflect the social
benefits and costs of the actions to be taken. We discuss several such pros-
pects below, using concepts discussed in Section 3:
1. P may be less than P . This might be due to price controls or to
the national security premium. It would lead to a circumstance
where firms had no interest in carrying out the introduction in-
vestment even though such an advance might be shown to be socially
desirable. Of course, the fact that the federal government may be
able to bring about such an investment at the introduction stage
does not mean that diffusion will take place. Private decision
makers will still be faced with a diffusion decision based on p.t
2. Inability to appropriate technical results. In terms of Figure
5.1 this would hold where no firm investing in Kg could expect
to capture enough of the market to take advantage of the infor-
mation a Gd[C(x)], which would be gained by the introduction ex-
periment.
3. Regulatory and political risks. These risks may give G i[C(x)] a
high variance (particularly by introducing extreme low-end events
into that distribution) and thus dramatically raise the risk pre-
mium which Kg must promise to earn. To the extent that these
uncertainties are artificially imposed, they constitute a "failure"
under the definition above.
4. Market structure. The lack of competitive pressure may lead some
firms to forego investments in innovation which would be socially
profitable.
5. Risk and financial markets. The dispersion of Gi[C(x)] and un-
certainties in P may be so large and the gross size of the invest-
ment Kg so great that corporate managers forego the introduction,
even though a careful expected value calculation (including dis-
counts for risk) predicts a positive return.
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5.2.3 Evaluation of the Benefits of Government Intervention
Most of the instruments discussed in Section 4 are methods for sub-
sidizing the cost K . A need for such support would be indicated by evidence
of one of the market failures noted above. The ultimate decision to go
ahead with the federal subsidy would depend on a calculation of the costs
and benefits of the expenditure involved.l
To see the nature of the evaluation problem, we may pursue our simple
example another step. Assume that for some reason the introduction invest-
ment will not be taken by private industry. The precise reasons why this
is not happening need not concern us here (later we take up the case where
introduction will eventually be undertaken by private capital, but the govern-
ment may speed up the process through a subsidy). We may look first at the
evaluation of the benefits of a direct federal expenditure of Kn. Later,
we return to look at the issues raised by the calculation of cost, for the
actual estimate of K may vary depending on the particular financial instru-
n
ment achieved to bring the investment about. For now, however, assume that
K is a simple direct federal expenditure.
Case 1. Prices and Costs are Known with Certainty, Instantaneous Diffusion,
No Social Premium on Energy. Suppose that the real price of imported oil
is $13 per barrel and that this price will prevail for the foreseeable future.
No extra value is attributed to independence from insecure energy sources,
so that the imported price is the social cost. Also suppose that the shale
oil plant we are using as an example can produce oil at a cost of $20 per
barrel with the first plant and that, because of what it learned, all subsequent
1That is, there may be "failures" that are not worth correcting, given
the opportunity costs of the resources required.
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units are expected to produce at a cost of $10 per barrel. That is, C*(x*) =
$20 per barrel but the means of G i[C(x)] and Gd [C(x)] are $10 per barrel.
If new firms can take advantage of the learning and produce at $10,
and new plants can be built very quickly, then the price of all crude oil
will fall to $10. Thus it will be impossible for the first investor to
recover the introduction investment and no individual firm will undertake
the initial expenditure K . Nevertheless, society clearly stands to gain
a great deal from having the price of oil reduced to $10 per barrel. Here
is a clear market failure: the returns to the initial investment are not
appropriable. The societal returns come in the form of consumers' surplus--
i.e., consumers pay less for energy.
We illustrate the case with Figure 5.2. In this diagram that market
price of energy, pm (assumed here to be independent of the time after in-
troduction), is measured on vertical axis and quantities produced and con-
sumed on the horizontal axis. The P il line illustrates the assumption that
oil is available in any quantity we want at a price set by the international
cartel. The line C(x) demonstrates that with the new technology, we could
produce any quantity desired at a cost pf $10. Finally, the D(x) curve
indicates what quantities would be consumed at various prices. As price de-
clines, more energy is consumed. The result then of lowering the cost to
consumers from Poil to C(x) is an expansion in the amount consumed. We can
measure the benefits as the shaded area. This area represents the difference
between what consumers pay for oil, pm = C(x), and what they would have been
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willing to pay for each unit. This is the change in "consumers' surplus"
and represents the benefits to society.
In this example, we assume that the investment will not take place with-
out government intervention (without specifying why). In a real situation,
the first analytical need would be to forecast actions of private investors
in the absence of intervention, as well as the likely behavior after the
intervention. As we have seen, it is the incremental changes due to the
intervention that constitute the benefits of the government action. In order
to be able to simulate this behavior, we need an understanding of why the
market is not functioning. It is obvious, for example, that in reality, en-
try to the new industry will not occur instantaneously as in the example.
Therefore all knowledge produced will not be inappropriable, and in this
simple example we would expect some private investment to eventually take
place in the absence of intervention. Nevertheless, if some benefits are
inappropriable, investment will be less than desired and the timing may be
delayed. More accurate descriptions of private incentives are needed in
order to understand what will ensue from government intervention and what
is the necessary level of subsidy.
Case 2. No Diffusion. Once we understand the market structure, the
key to the decision analyses is distribution of costs of production G[C(x)]
and prices of delived output P . The profitability of government interven-
tion in Case 1 revolves around the price of energy before the new technology,
1The cost of obtaining these benefits is the amount of the initial subsidy.
Note, however, that this example is highly simplified. The cost of the new
technology might depend on the rate of output. Also, technologies based
on depleted resources will exhibit rising costs as the cheapest deposits
are depleted, unless new technologies are developed. These issues will be
taken up below.
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the initial cost of the technology, and the cost of the technology after the
introduction stage. If, for example, we change the above example so that
the new option will produce energy at a cost of $14 per barrel once we build
the first plant, the evaluation changes dramatically. The government subsidy
no longer yields positive benefits. Now we lose $7 per barrel on the initial
plant, but wind up at a situation where the price of energy is no lower than
$13 per barrel. There has been no return to consumers, producers are no
better off, and the government has lost its initial subsidy. We may have
learned a great deal about the technology and the environmental and institu-
tional barriers, but the knowledge is not worth anything in the market.
Clearly, prices need not be static. If oil prices rise, the situation
changes. Then $14 oil might, in fact, ultimately prove economic and the re-
turns to the subsidy would be positive.
In summary, we need to know (a) what the energy price pm will be in the
absence of the technology, and with it; (b) what initial subsidy is necessary
to encourage the first plant; (c) what the cost of subsequent plants will
be; and (d) what quantities will be demanded. We would then simulate be-
havior before and after the intervention and sum the benefits to consumers and
producers as a whole. To know (a), (c and (d), we need information on the
supply curves for the new technology, the old energy source, and the demand
curve. To know (b), we must understand the nature of the market failure. We
will return to these issues in Section 5.3 below.
Case 3. Diffusion over Time. To approach a step closer to reality we as-
sume that the market price of energy, P , will continue to be set by imports of
oil, because the new technique will not instantaneously diffuse to take over
the entire import volume. The crux of the analysis then is the forecasting
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of x given G [C(x)] and an estimate of pm. During the period when the market
price is greater than the cost of the new option there is another component
of the social benefits (besides consumers' surplus). This is producers' sur-
plus--the difference between the selling price of the new product and its cost.
Case 4. Uncertain Prices, Uncertain Costs, Diffusion over Time. In
Cases 1, 2, and 3 we treat the problem as a simple calculation under complete
certainty about future prices and costs. Of course, such certainty never
exists and decisions must be made without full knowledge of future prices
and costs. The problem then becomes more complicated. A planner will have
an expected market price, but will realize that the actual price pm could vary
within a wide range. Similarly, as discussed earlier, the costs for the initial
plant, Kg, will be uncertain as well as costs of production from subsequent
units G[C(x)]. In this case, the evaluation will be made based on expected
costs and benefits.
Let us extend our example to encompass this case. Assume that in the
future the real price of oil as set by the cartel is most likely to be $13
per barrel but could be as low as $5 and as high as $20. Assume also that the
product costs from subsequent plants are expected to be $10, but could be as
high as $20 and as low as $5. Let us make these ranges more precise by attach-
ing a 1/2 probability to the medium and 1/4 probability to each of the ex-
tremes. We then have the probabilities for each outcome shown in Table 5.1.
There is a return to the initial subsidy attached to each possible outcome.
If the cost of the technology turns out to be no less than the price of oil,
the return is zero or negative. If the cost is less, there is a positive re-
turn. The total returns will depend on the output levels for the new tech-
nology over time, xt, given by demand conditions and the associated pace of
diffusion of the new technology.
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Table 5.1
PROBABILITY OF EACH COMBINATION OF POSSIBLE
OIL PRICE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY COST
Price of Oil pm (Probability of Occurrence)
G [C(x)]
Technology Cost
(Probability of
Occurance)
$5(.25)
$10(.5)
$20(.25)
$5(..25)
.0625
.125
.0625
$13(.5)
.125
.25
125
$20(.25)
.0625
.125
.0625
The probability information may be incorporated into our framework as
follows. The joint probabilities of the price of oil and the cost of the new
technology being a particular value is given in Table 5.1. Assume that the cost
of output from the first plant, C*(x*), is known with certainty. There are
nine possible benefit outcomes and three possible cost outcomes. The expected
net benefits are found by summing the two sets of outcomes weighted by the
probability of occurance. Thus:
9 3
P B - P C.
i=l j=l J Expected net social benefits =
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where Pi,Pj, are the probabilities of occurrence and Bi,C are the results of
evaluating the costs and benefits using the analysis developed in the pre-
vious three cases.
Case 5. Government Speedup of Introduction, No Social Premium on Energy.
In actuality, of course, many (if not most) of the technical options sup-
ported in government commercialization programs would ultimately be introduced
into the market without the subsidy--the government only accelerates the pro-
cess. Thus a crucial analytical issue becomes industry's behavior without
the government subsidy. The benefit analyses then become more complex, with
the difference in the timing of the benefit streams due to government's invest-
ment taking the place of the total benefit associated with the new technique.
Case 6. Premium on Energy. Finally, there is the additional but cru-
cial evaluation issue associated with the fact that the market price of
energy is not likely to reflect its social value. As discussed earlier, this
will likely be due to government price controls and the benefits of reducing
imports.
In this case the increased availability of domestic supplies, increased
conservation, and reduction of imports need to be valued not at the market
price, but at the social value. The analysis of private investment decisions
continues, of course, to be made at the market price.
The decision, of course, need not be made only on the basis of this simple
expected payoff. Even if the expected payoff were negative, we might be will-
ing to undertake the program just to be sure that if price goes to $20 per
barrel, we have the new technology available. In a world of uncertainty, of
course, private firms will be willing to speculate on higher prices. However,
institutional constraints often prevent the price from rising to a level that
clears the market. Private firms will therefore not invest enough in the
new technology and the government could provide insurance. In this case, we
would have to compare this form of insurance to other alternatives to make
sure this is the cheapest way for the country to purchase protection.
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Case 7. The Government Waits. The discussion so far has treated the
problem as if the decision to subsidize or not must be made now. This, of
couse, is unrealistic. An important variable under the decision maker's
control is when to invest. Are we much better off waiting? What do we gain
(or lose) by waiting? Several things can make it worthwhile to wait. If
there are new technologies under development that offer the hope of lower
costs, it clearly can pay to wait. Also, more can be discovered about
the future costs and prices, thus changing the probability distributions de-
scribed in Case 4. The risk of an investment-cum-subsidy program can be re-
duced as future outcomes become clearer. Of course, it is possible nothing
will become clearer. For example, uncertainty about pm due to lack of in-
formation about the oil cartel behavior might remain high. No new technology
might appear promising. In this case, there is no reason to wait.
5.3 THE STATE-OF-THE ART OF ANALYSIS
The previous discussion, and the simple cases used to illustrate the
problems of analysis, lead to the identification of several areas of analy-
sis and forecasting which are crucial to the evaluation of schemes of federal
intervention in commercial demonstration. All analytical efforts which at-
tempt to evaluate national income benefits from this type of investment must
deal with these issues in one way or another. As might be expected from the
sheer complexity of the problem, these constitute key areas for future re-
search and analysis in an effort to improve our ability to analyze these
circumstances. A brief discussion of the key problems follows; they con-
stitute an agenda for research in this vital policy area.
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5.3.1 Forecasts of Prices
As is evident from the cases presented here, a key input to all the
analysis is a forecast of the market prices that will hold over the period
when a technology might be introduced and diffused. In addition, the fore-
cast of price needs to convey some notion of the rules of the game under
which energy prices in general are being determined, as that will affect the
likely response of private markets. In general, the analysis would be
based on a single price (or a single distribution of prices) which would not
be assumed to be affected by the commercialization investments under study,
although as Case 1 illustrates there may be circumstances where the analysis
would need to take account of such an effect by a new technology.
This emphasis on a price forecast was argued in Section 2, where it
was stated that a key problem for ERDA planning is that the agency must
incorporate some notion of likely future market conditions--and, in par-
ticular, some estimate of a "planning price"--in its analyses of commercial-
ization investments. (Of course, the problem presented by the need to analyze
ERDA planning decisions at the commercialization stage will appear in con-
nection with earlier stages in R&D as well.) Without such a forecast of
price, and perhaps other market conditions, it is not possible to distinguish
clearly between technologies which may yield positive benefits if intro-
duced and those which will not.
The forecast of market price ultimately depends on analysis of inter-
national oil markets, on the tariff or other policies that may be used to
buffer the U.S. economy from these prices, and on the process of price forma-
tion in product and region markets throughout the economy. Some steps in
this process are well understood, others are not. Overall, this is a key area
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for further research and analysis because of its importance to the evalua-
tion procedure discussed above.
In addition, for evaluation purposes one also needs a forecast of a
companion price to go along with the market price forecast--this price to
reflect the social value of energy produced or saved. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.1 above, the social value of energy may depart from the market
price. With respect to domestic petroleum, it seems clear that the social
value is at least the price of landed imports--OPEC is the source of mar-
ginal supplies to the United States and will remain so for some time to
come. It is argued in Section 3.3.2 that in fact the social value is even
higher--that there is a national security premium associated with our de-
pendence on imports. The premium is the amount the United States would be
willing to pay for a barrel of oil, above the imported price, to be free
from the insecurity associated with it. Thus, some form of national security
premium must be estimated to arrive at a social value.
One measure of the national security premium is given by the cost of a
stockpile which would counteract the effect of the imports. Suppose, for the
purpose of illustration, that all imports are equally insecure, and that a
storage program can in fact provide a counteractive security to imports.
Then clearly the size of the appropriate stockpile is a monotonically in-
creasing function of the level of imports. At any given level of imports,
the incremental cost of the stockpile associated with one more daily bar-
rel of imported oil would then be the national security premium.
The appropriate stockpile size might be calculated as an optimum where
the cost of maintaining the stockpile is traded off against the expected
savings in the case of an embargo plus the value of the deterrent effect
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(i.e., the lowered probability of embargo). A more intuitive measure of
the incremental stockpile cost can be found by assuming that the size of
the stockpile should always be directly proportional to the level of im-
ports; then the proportionality constant can be thought of as the period
over which the stockpile could replace the imports. If the stockpile
is chosen to provide N years of supply at the annual rate of imports I,
if the cost of the stockpile is solely the opportunity cost of the capi-
tal investment in inventoried petroleum (i), and the petroleum is purchased
at the international market price (pm), then the annual cost of the stock-
pile for each barrel per year of imports is L x pm x N x i. Thus, the national
security premium would be N x i per cent of the imported price. If the in-
terest rate were 6% and a 1-year stockpile were deemed sufficient, then the
premium on each barrel would be 6% of the landed cost. Of course this
simple calculation misses many complicating factors in the international and
domestic petroleum scene, but it illustrates that a social value based on
reasonable assumptions and judgements could be constructed.
5.3.2. Analysis of the Diffusion Process
As shown in Case 3, the evaluation of the benefits of the more rapid in-
troduction of new technology depends ultimately on forecasts of the diffusion
of those technologies through the relevant energy markets. That is, given
estimates of cost, Gi[C(x)] or Gd[C(x)], the analysis depends on some method
for estimating xt given these cost forecasts and the market price data dis-
cussed above.
In general, this step requires a set of methods for analyzing transpor-
tation, processing, and energy technology choice, so that one can simulate
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the way the economy adjusts to a new technology given that is has survived
the introduction stage. These estimates may be made in a variety of ways--
ranging from informed judgements and calculations to highly elaborated for-
mal models. In the latter category, for example, efforts at Stanford Research
Institute and Brookhaven National Laboratory provide a framework for con-
ditional forecasting of the expected penetration of new and emerging energy
technologies and products based on the cost and efficiency attributes of these
technologies. The SRI-Gulf model is a network representation of the U.S.
energy system which provides a very detailed description of the processing,
conversion, and transportation activities required to process primary energy
supplies (coal, oil, gas, and uranium) into energy forms desired for end-use
demand. The model has sub-national supply and-consuming regions. It requires
as input the cost and efficiency attributes of existing and new technologies,
end-use demands, and supply functions for the primary energy resources; it
determines the quantities and prices of energy in intermediate and final de-
livered forms. The model has been used extensively in support of the Inter-
Agency Task Force on Synthetic Fuels. 3
1SRI-Gulf Energy Model: Overview of Methodology, E.J. Cazelet (Stanford
Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, 1975). The development of the
SRI model was supported by Gulf, which is continuing to develop and utilize
the model independently of SRI.
2Brookhaven Energy System Optimization Model (Associated Universities, Inc.
Upton, New York, 1974), E.A. Cherniavsky, Brookhaven National Laboratory
Topical Report No. BNL-19569.
3
"Recommendations for a Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program," Syn-
fuels Inter-Agency Task Force (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
November, 1975). Four Volumes.
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The Brookhaven Energy System Optimization Model (BESOM), is an explicit
optimization model which also includes a network representation of the energy
system, describing the intermediate processing and conversion activities be-
tween extraction of primary energy supplies and delivery of final energy
forms. The model is national in scope and requires input data on end-use de-
mands, the primary supplies available, and the characterization of the inter-
mediate processing and conversion technology costs and efficiencies. The
model uses this information to determine the least-cost combination of existing
and new energy technologies required to satisfy end-use demands, consistent
with environmental restrictions included as constraints in the model.
Both the SRI-Gulf and Brookhaven models are valuable tools for conditional
analysis of technology choice. Two crucial problems are not addressed by
either of these modelling efforts however. First, we would expect that the
actual commercial availability of a new technology will depend critically on
market factors. As we have emphasized, the process of technological change
can be viewed as a series of investments. If these investments are made by
industry, then they are very much dependent on expectations of future market
circumstances.
Thus, a model which purports to explain the penetration of new technolo-
gies must also explain the evolution of events which lead to the "availability"
of those technologies at a point in time. None of the existing analyses come
close to doing this. This is an extremely important (and difficult) research
issue.
A second, and closely related, issue concerns the demand for these new
technologies. Simple models of consumer behavior based upon simple cost
considerations are probably not adequate to characterize consumer response
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to a new product or technology. A more reasonable approach would be to con-
sider expected consumer reaction to the attributes of new technologies,
based upon observing their response to these attributes in existing technolo-
gies. The problem is essentially one of using information on consumer response
to existing technologies to project reactions to technologies and products
not yet observed. The issue of consumer demand for new technologies is not
addressed in the SRI-Gulf and Brookhaven models, nor by any other models of
energy technology choice with which we are familiar.
5.3.3 Estimation of Industry Activity in the Absence of Government
Intervention
As illustrated by Case 4, the benefits of a government program at the
point of commerical introduction depends on the likely events that would take
place if there were no intervention. It may be, as assumed in Case 1 that
nothing would happen without government subsidy. On the other hand, it may
be that government subsidy only substitutes for industry investment that would
take place in any case, or that it only speeds up the introduction process
by a period of a few months or a year or two. In such a case, precious public
resources are being devoted to a low-value project. In order to analyze any
particular proposal, or to compare proposals, it is necessary to have some under-
standing of what may take place without intervention, and this once again leads
to a need for a clearer understanding of the nature of the market process, how
it fails, and how one might gather information about likely industry involve-
ment at the introduction stage.
A third deficiency is that demands for energy services are assumed by
the model to be inelastic with price.
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5.3.4 Estimation of the Likely Effect of a Commercial Demonstration
The next key link in the evaluation process is between the introduction
investment given some ex ante appreciation of likely costs Gi[C(x)] and the
resulting information after the introduction has been tried, G d[C(x)]. One
may be able to develop methods for forecasting the rate of market diffusion
given assumptions about the cost of the technology, as discussed in Sub-
section 5.3.2, but analysis of any particular scheme requires some way to
make a link between current expected costs, the government subsidy in commer-
cial demonstration, and the cost inputs that one would put into such a model
for forecasting diffusion.
5.3.5 Estimation of the Differential Costs and Effects of Alternative
Instruments
As discussed in Section 4.4, the alternative instruments used by the
government to subsidize the introduction stage may have very different costs.
A fact not discussed earlier is that different instruments may have different
effects on the amount of learning that takes place in the introduction stage.
In order to choose among the different types of programs discussed in Section
4, one needs to be able to distinguish between the different instruments and
their ability to produce a good measure of G d[C(x)].
The problem of estimating the costs of various government incentives can
be illustrated by again turning to the loan guarantee. The cost of a loan
guarantee (i.e., the dollar value of the subsidy provided) is the difference
between (1) the market value of the debt claim with the guarantee and (2)
what the claim's market value would be if the guarantee were removed. Esti-
mating the cost is not difficult if the debt would be a high-grade issue ab-
sent the guarantee. But in such cases the cost is probably small--that is,
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the loan guarantee is unlikely to provide a subtantial subsidy--and there-
fore is not likely to have much impact.
Loan guarantees are effective subsidies only when the unguaranteed debt
has a high probability of default. ("High" is measured relative to the default
probabilities normally incurred by private lenders.) But the higher the like-
lihood of default, the harder it will be to find an existing debt issue that is
(1) actively traded and (2) a close substitute for the guaranteed bond in all
aspects except the guarantee. The only candidates will bonds of firms which
are already in financial distress. It would be difficult to find any existing
traded bonds which would be close substitutes for unguaranteed debt secured
by, say, a shale oil facility, with a 50 percent ratio of debt to total cap-
italization.
There is a methodology for evaluating risky debt claims that does not
require observing the prices of substitutes. It states that the difference
between a debt claim's guaranteed and unguaranteed values is a positive func-
tion of the actual present value of the assets standing behind the debt, the
-The methodology is an extension of the option-pricing formula developed by
Black and Scholes ("The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,"
F. Black and M. Scholes, Journal of Political Economy, May-June, 1974,
637-50). There is an article published by Merton applying the methodology to
value relative v simple debt claims ("On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The
Risk Structure of Interest Rates," R.C. Merton, Journal of Finance, May, 1974,
449-70). Other work (as yet unpublished)indicates that the approach gives rea-
sonable estimates of the value of actual risky debt claims.
An alternative approach is to use information available (from solicitations
or from calculations) on the price guarantees which would be demanded for a
given commercial demonstration with and without loan guarantees and then
estimate the value of the guarantee as the net present value of the difference
in revenue streams to the firms. This method and that discussed above are
utilized in Appendix A.
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degree of uncertainty about the assets' future value, the maturity of the debt
claim, the provisions of the indenture (coupon payments, repayment schedules,
etc.) and the current time value of money. The theory's advantage is that it
provides a rigorous basis for calculating the value of the guarantee.
One difficulty with this theory is that it assumes that the value of
the firms' assets--the value of all its outstanding securities--is independent
of the proportions of debt and equity financing. This may not be true, since
the existence of risky debt changes the incentives governing operating and in-
vestment strategy. This happens regardless of whether the risky debt is
guaranteed. Estimating the uncertainty of the assets' future value is a major
.. task as well.
5.3.6 Summary
In Section 5.1 we presented a semi-formal model of government-supported
commercialization efforts which summarized the qualitative discussion of Sec-
tions 3 and 4. We then (in Section 5.2) built up the key elements of the
analysis problem. In Section 5.3 we have addressed the deficiencies in our
analytical capabilities. While the general features of the analysis problem are
clear, there are important issues where both conceptual development and new
analytical tools are required. However, the concepts and tools which are
available are sufficient for analyses incorporating many of the key elements
of the framework discussed in this paper.
